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ABSTRACT
Europeanization of Minority Policies under Conditionality: A Comparative Study of Latvia,
Bulgaria and Turkey

Emel Elif Tugdar

This study analyzes the impact of domestic factors on the Europeanization of minority
protection policies in Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey. The study argues that domestic conditions have
significant impact on the decision of the candidate states on fulfilling the EU requirements in the
field of human rights issues during the candidacy period. The study specifically analyzes the
impact of ‘governments’, ‘significant institutions’ and ‘mobilization of ethnic minorities’ as
domestic factors during the time frame between the official candidacies to accession to the
European Union. The methodology combines a review of official European Union documents such
as progress reports, accession documents and human rights reports, press articles, speeches, and
academic literature. The study found that Europeanization can occur with the support of domestic
factors in the field of human rights/ minority protection.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1.

Introduction

European Union membership requires that the candidate country has achieved
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights, the rule of law and
respect for and protection of minorities.1
The European Union links the ‘membership conditionality’ to minority protection, which
refers to the policy changes and legislative reforms in the candidate states that are determined by
the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ in 1993. These criteria included the rule of law, stable democratic
institutions, human rights and respect for minorities. The candidate states of the EU are required
to make policy changes in these areas before they become an official member. This policy transfer
is called Europeanization. Europeanization is a two way process which involves both bottom-up
and top-down dimensions. The member states of the European Union can upload their policies in
specific policy areas to the European level. They can download policies from European level to
their state level as well (Kurzer 2001; Bulmer and Padgett 2004; Bulmer and Radaelli 2005;
Featherstone and Radaelli 2005; Börzel and Risse 2006).
Although Europeanization is a two way process, this not valid for the candidate states. For
the candidate states Europeanization is a top-down process through the acquis communautaire
(Rose 2005). As a condition of admission, applicant countries are required to accept the EU
practices in all policy fields. This process forces the candidates to reexamine their policies and
check member states’ policies with best practices in the EU. These best practices come from the
policies of ‘leader’ states, who are also referred as pace-setters (Börzel 2002). Leader states can
1

“The political criteria for EU membership”, Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen June 2122 1993, accessed January 20, 2012,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/copenhagen/co_en.pdf
1

shape European policies according to domestic preferences. It is the process that the domestic
policies are exported to the European level and then adopted by other Member States.
Because Europeanization has occurred as a top-down process, the EU ‘member
conditionality’ has attracted many criticisms. These critiques include the ambiguity of the
conditions and their inconsistent applications. Besides, there are arguments in the literature that
state that the EU is more demanding to candidate countries than to its members (Grabbe 2006;
Hudges et al 2004; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005; Börzel & Buzogany 2009). This is one of
the discussions that my analysis is based on. In this analysis, I expect to see how effective
Europeanization is for the minority policies of my three different cases. Therefore I ask “in the
minority protection issues, which domestic factors lead to Europeanization of minority policies” in
the cases I choose. With an in depth comparative case study analysis of three cases, this research
makes an analysis of Europeanization of minority policies in Latvia, Turkey and Bulgaria.
1.2.

Research Question

The purpose of this research is to contribute to the literature on Europeanization of
minority protection policies. Focusing on human rights and minority issues as the policy area, this
study analyzes the effect of Europeanization in Latvia, Turkey and Bulgaria. In this research, I aim
to answer the questions that “under which domestic conditions are the minority protection
measures adopted and maintained in the EU member/candidate states?”
The transformation of the character of the European Union since its foundation and the
diffusion of European norms facilitated a significant improvement of minority rights. The
declaration of the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993 marked respect for minority rights as a condition
for EU membership. However, the asymmetry between current and past EU membership criteria
brings diverse experiences of Europeanization in the field of minority rights, which in turn makes
2

comparison difficult. Therefore, this study aims to compare the impact of Europeanization on the
minority policies of two recently acceded states, namely Latvia and Bulgaria, and Turkey as a
current candidate.
Vachudova (2005) argues that minority rights protection is one of the areas where the
asymmetry of power between the EU member states and the candidates is most in evidence. That
is because the candidates are being required to meet goals that the member states have not set
for themselves.2 To see these possible changes, this study covers three different cases two of
which are member states and third the candidate. This gives me an opportunity to make
predictions about the future of EU minority rights policies regarding both current member states
and possible candidate states.
1.3.

Membership Conditionality in European Union

The European Union operates comprehensive approval procedures that ensure new
member states are admitted only when they can demonstrate they will be able to play their part
fully as members. This means complying with all the EU's standards and rules, having the consent
of the EU institutions and EU member states and having the consent of their citizens as expressed
through approval in their national parliament or by referendum.
The Treaty on the European Union states that any European country may apply for
membership if it respects the democratic values of the EU and is committed to promoting them.
The first step is for the country to meet the key criteria for accession. These were defined at the
European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 and are hence referred to as 'Copenhagen criteria'.

2

Milada Anna Vachudova: Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage. Integration After
Communism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),182.
3

The EU Summit in Copenhagen in June 1993 decided to open EU membership to the
Central and East European countries. The established criteria are those to be followed by all
countries applying for membership of the EU.3 The conditions are:
- stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities;
- existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
- ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of
political, economic & monetary union. 4
After initial transitional periods, countries must undertake all the obligations of the EU. At
the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, it was agreed to initiate negotiations on EU
membership with ten applicant countries. The agreement was signed in Athens, 16 April 2003. The
new members joined the EU on 1 May 2004.
The conditions and timing of the candidate's adoption, implementation and enforcement
of all current EU rules in other words the "acquis communitaire" are divided into 35 policy fields
such as environment, economy, transportation, etc., that are negotiated separately. Throughout
the negotiations, the Commission monitors the candidate's progress in applying EU legislation
and meeting its other commitments, including any requirements. This gives the candidate
additional guidance as it assumes the responsibilities of membership, as well as an assurance to
current members that the candidate is meeting the conditions for joining. The Commission also
keeps the EU Council and European Parliament informed throughout the process, through official

3

Elena Fierro. EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice. (Netherlands: Kluwer
Law International, 2003), 168.
4
Ibid, 18.
4

documents such as strategy papers, annual progress reports and clarifies the conditions for the
candidate state the conditions for further progress.5
1.4.

Human Rights Policies of the European Union

"The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by
the principles which have inspired its own creation, development
and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world:
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human
dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law." 6
The European Union gives great importance to respect for human rights. Its human rights
principles are set out in the Treaty on European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Based on several initiatives and programs, the EU’s action focuses on combating discrimination,
racism and xenophobia and on protecting vulnerable groups, such as children, women and
minorities. The European Fundamental Rights Agency monitors respect for the Union’s core
values. In particular, it provides assistance and expertise to Member States and the Union bodies
implementing EU law on fundamental rights.
Since the foundation of the European Union, the human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights are the values that have been embedded in
the EU treaties.7 Today, they have been reinforced by the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the
EU. The 2012 Strategic Framework & Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy is one of the
5

Elena Fierro. EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice. 8.
“Treaty of Lisbon”, accessed March 8 2013,
http://eurlex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML
7
Philip Alston, Mara Bustelo, James Heenan, eds., E.U. and Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999),175.
6

5

initiatives designed to improve the effectiveness and consistency of EU human rights policy as a
whole.8 The adoption of the EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy represents
a watershed in EU policymaking. Since its foundation, the EU has developed a range of
'guidelines' and other policy guidance on human rights issues, but it is the first time that a unified
strategic document has been adopted. In order to contribute to implementation of the Strategic
Framework and the Action Plan, the High Representative has proposed the appointment of an EU
Special Representative on Human Rights. Again in 2012, Lambrinidis was appointed as the first EU
Special Representative for Human Rights to enhance the effectiveness and visibility of the EU
external human rights policy. 9 Furthermore, the EU publishes an Annual Report on application of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and human rights and democracy in the world.
Within the EU, fundamental rights are guaranteed at state level by each member state's
constitutional system and at EU level by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that was adopted
in 2000. Based on the rights given, the EU citizens may bring a case before the European Court of
Human Rights, although it is not an EU body. Other EU institutions such as the Commission,
Parliament and Council play a role in human rights protection as well. They are assisted by
the Fundamental Rights Agency, which identifies and analyses major trends in the field of
fundamental rights.
The European Union promotes the human rights through their foreign policy as well.
Therefore, the EU has put the human rights issue at the forefront of its relations with other
countries and regions. All agreements on trade or cooperation with non-EU countries include a

8

“EU adopts Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy”, EU Press Release, accessed
March 10 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PESC-12-285_en.htm
9
“Stavros Lambrinidis appointed first EU Special Representative for Human Rights”, accessed
March 10 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2012/250712_euenvoy_en.htm
6

human rights clause stipulating that human rights are an essential element in relations. 10 There
are now more than 120 such agreements. Furthermore, the EU has imposed sanctions for human
rights problems on a number of countries including Belarus and Iran. The EU also
undertakes human rights dialogues with over 40 countries and organizations, including Russia,
China and the African Union. 11
In the face of a political and economic crisis affecting the European Union and many of its
member states, protection of human rights is not a priority. Especially those negatively affected
are marginalized or unpopular groups, such as Roma, migrants, and asylum seekers. Thus, it EU
institutions can be argues to largely fail to live up to the promise of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, with the European Council particularly reluctant to hold member states to
account for abuse. The findings of my analysis of Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey are consistent with
this current attitude of the EU towards human rights as well.
1.5.

Structure of the Dissertation

The structure of this research is as follows. After the introductory chapter which broadly
covers the research question(s) and brief survey of the human rights policies of the European
Union, the next chapter (Chapter 2) presents conceptualization and theoretical framework for
Europeanization and other concepts with main argument and hypotheses, research design, and
methodology. Chapter 3 analyzes the case of Latvia which is followed by Chapter 4 that focuses on
the case of Bulgaria. Chapter 5 makes and in depth analysis of Turkey. Finally, chapter 6 concludes
the study by summarizing the findings with a special focus on the most recent developments on
minority issues in three cases and points out avenues for future research.

10

Georg Wiessala, Re-Orienting the Fundamentals: Human Rights and New Connections in EUAsia Relations, (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), 102.
11
Ibid, 55.
7

CHAPTER 2
THEORY & METHODS
2. Theory and Methods
2.1.

Theoretical Framework

The European Union links the ‘membership conditionality’ to minority protection, which
refers to the policy changes and legislative reforms in the candidate states that are determined by
the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ in 1993. These criteria included the rule of law, stable democratic
institutions, human rights and respect for minorities. The candidate states of the EU are required
to make policy changes in these areas before they become an official member. This policy transfer
is called Europeanization, which is the major concept for my analysis.
2.1.1. Europeanization Theory
Europeanization has become one of the most widely used theoretical approaches for
studying the EU and its influence on the current and future EU member states, which has emerged
as an ‘academically developing industry’.12 There is a wide range of literature on conceptualizing
the term and identifying how this process might shape a country’s internal politics. While there is
considerable debate about how to define ‘Europeanization’ (Börzel 2002; Börzel and Risse 2003,
2007; Cowles et al. 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Ladrech 2010; Mair 2000; Radaelli
2003), the term is generally used with regard to “the domestic impact of the EU”

13

and thus

constitutes a crucial concept for analyzing the Union's transformative power through diffusion of
ideas, namely rules, values and norms (Börzel and Risse, 2008).

12

J. P. Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40:5
(2002): 921.
13
Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Pre-accession Conditionality and Post-accession Compliance in the New
Member States: a Research Note” in Après Enlargement: Legal and Political Responses in Central
and Eastern Europe, ed. Wojciech Sadurski et al. (Italy: European University Institute, 2006), 145.
8

Europeanization is the key concept of this study. In the literature, Europeanization is
mostly defined as the interactions and impact of the EU on domestic actors and structures.14
Europeanization is a two way process that involves both bottom-up and top-down dimensions. The
member states’ governments both shape European policy outcomes and adapt to them. The topdown approach refers to how member states respond to a growing European impact on their
domestic level of policy.15 This notion of Europeanization is described by Cowles et al (2001) as
the emergence and development at the European level of district structures of governance, that
is, political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize
interactions among actors and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative
European rules.
The literature in Europeanization studies has historically focused on a top-down
perspective, analyzing the impact of its transformative power on the countries that have already
joined the EU (Cowles et al. 2001; Radaelli 2000, Goetz and Hix, 2001). According to Börzel
(2002) uploading is also a way to minimize the costs that the implementation of European norms
and rules may impose on member states’ constituencies. 16 Therefore, member states have an
incentive to upload their domestic policies to the European level in order to minimize the costs of
EU adaptation.17 The member states seek to shape European policy-making according to their
interests. Börzel and Risse (2006) explain Europeanization as a process of construction, diffusion
and institutionalization of rules, procedures and policy paradigms and shared beliefs and norms,
which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then
14

Lee McGowan, “Europeanization unleashed and rebounding: assessing the modernization of EU
cartel policy”, Journal of European Public Policy 12:6, (2005): 996.
15
Ibid.
16
Tanja Börzel, “Pace-setting, foot-dragging and fence-setting: member states’ responses to
Europeanization” Journal of Common Market Studies.40:2 (2002): 212.
17
Ibid.
9

incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.
(See Figure 2.1)
Figure 2.1: Dimensions of Domestic Change: Polity, Policy, and Politics18

EU has an impact on the cultural norms and national identities of the candidate and the
member states as well (Kurzer 2001, Olsen 2002). Therefore, Europeanization is not limited to
changes in political and administrative structures and policy changes, but European values are
also to some degree internalized at the domestic level, shaping discourses and identities (Olsen
2002). Kurzer (2001) also defined Europeanization as an institutional adjustment to wider
European rules, structures, and styles and the diffusion of informal understandings and meanings
of EU norms. This argument is based on the idea that further political integration is necessary for a
closer union. Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) called this ‘domestic assimilation’ and stressed the
importance of the change in the logic of political behavior in the member states. They argued that
Europeanization involves the domestic assimilation of EU policy and politics. Similarly, Bulmer

18

Source: Tanja Börzel, “How the EU interacts with its member states”, Riehe Politikwissenschaft,

Political Science Series, 93 (2003):4.

10

and Radaelli (2005) argued that the concept of Europeanization is different from EU policy
making. The concept of Europeanization is about the impact of European policy within member
states. The creation of a shared understanding of policy through learning on the part of the states
is important for the success of Europeanization.
Bulmer and Padgett (2004) bring an institutionalist perspective to policy transfer in EU.
They show how the policy transfer process and the outcomes are institution-dependent. The
differences in the transfer types are due to the diversity of governance structures. Bulmer and
Padgett (2004) name the three models of policy transfer as transfer by hierarchy, negotiated
transfer, and transfer by facilitated unilateralism. According to Bulmer and Padgett (2004),
hierarchy is the most productive form of EU governance for policy transfer. It is about the EU level
regulation that emphasizes the supranational authority and applies European law to enforce these
regulations. The exercise of this supranational authority in hierarchical governance brings strong
forms of policy transfer.
Although Europeanization is a two way process, for the candidate states the transfer
occurs differently. Rose (2005) stated that for the candidate states Europeanization is a top-down
process through acquis communautaire. This process forces the applicants to reexamine their
policies and look to the member states with best practices in the EU. These best practices come
from the policies of ‘leader’ member states. Börzel (2002) talks about how the member states with
different policy preferences respond to Europeanization. She claims that their responses are
shaped initially by their policy preferences and then by their action capacity. Both of the reasons
depend on the level of economic development in this state. Börzel (2002) draws three strategies
that European Union members follow while responding the Europeanization. The pace-setters are
the ‘leaders’ of this policy transfer. They shape European policies according to domestic
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preferences. It is through this process that the domestic policies are exported to the European
level and then adopted by other member states.
However, for the new member states, uploading policy preferences is less possible
compared to old members as Europeanization occurs as a top-down process through the EU
conditionality, which attracts many criticisms in literature. These critiques include the ambiguity
of the conditions and their inconsistent applications. In addition, there are arguments in literature
that state that the EU is more demanding to candidate countries than its members (Grabbe 2006,
Hudges et al 2004, Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005, Börzel & Buzogany 2009). Glenn (2004)
defines Europeanization as simply the domestic impact of EU integration. Analyzing the patterns
of adaptation process during candidacy, Glenn (2004) clearly points out the success of policy
transfer from the EU to the candidate states during negotiation process. However, whether these
adaptations would be long-lasting cannot be envisioned or guaranteed. To analyze this, I compare
pre-accession and post-accession processes of two member states and pre-accession period of a
candidate states during the process of Europeanization.
Similarly Grabbe (2006) states that the EU’s long-term influence works primarily through
persuasion and voluntary adaptation rather than exclusion and coercion. After accession, the
future of policies cannot be envisioned clearly. Grabbe (2006) refers to Europeanization as an
ambiguous process despite the EU’s enormous potential to influence the public policy in
candidate countries. Therefore, for the Central and Eastern European members Europeanization
started as “a process of meeting of accession requirements and the adoption of EU norms, policies
and institutional models” although it aimed to be a process of “moving beyond communist
legacies and regaining a full role in the European political and economic space”19. Focusing on
19
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the policy areas concerned with regulating the movement of persons in all Central and Eastern
European countries between 1989 and 2004, Grabbe (2006) finds that requirements had not been
fully fulfilled in Central and Eastern Europe due to the inconsistency and lack of precision in the
Union’s membership criteria.
Börzel and Buzogany (2009) also show that the implementation and application of the EU
environmental acquis has imposed significant costs on the accession countries in the field of
integrated pollution control and nature protection and has posed serious challenges both to state
and non-state actors in Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Therefore, the findings confirmed that the
pressure of EU compliance may be necessary but not sufficient to empower non-state actors,
which in turn make the future of the policy voluntary.
Other studies are more cautious in their evaluation of the impact of EU conditionality at
the domestic level of the new members of the European Union. Olsen (2003) argues that although
the effect of Europeanization is undeniable, there has been neither a revolutionary change in any
of the state systems nor a convergence towards a common institutional model. Featherstone
(2003) states that, although it may differ between different policy areas, convergence as a result
of Europeanization is far from being inevitable. About the domestic adaptation, Risse, Cowles &
Caporaso (2001) conclude that there is neither wholesale convergence nor continuing divergence
of national policy structures, institutions and other relationships. According to Schimmelfennig et
al (2002), ‘conditionality’ does not imply a clear causal relationship, but it is rather reinforcement
of democratization. Hughes et al. (2004) have argued that there is only a weak clear-cut causal
relationship between conditionality and policy or institutional outcomes (Hughes et al. 2004).
The results of my analysis of Europeanization process, specifically in Latvia and Bulgaria is
consistent with the ‘conditionality’ argument of Hughes et al (2004) and Schimmelfennig et al
(2002), as the non-perfect compliance of both states were ignored by the European Union and
13

could not block their way for accession. However, it should be noted that the impact of
conditionality is directly related with the policy area as stated by Featherstone (2003). Human
Rights and Minority Protection is one of these policy areas that the states’ perception of the EU
conditionality is more likely to take form of interference to sovereignty.
2.1.2. European Union and Minority Protection Policies:

The European Union’s one boundary is democracy and human rights. The
Union is open only to countries which uphold basic values such as free elections,
respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law.20
The term ‘minority’ is another important concept in our study. Preece (2005) describes
minorities as those who may be denied or prevented from enjoying the full rights of membership
within a political community because their religion, race, language, or ethnicity differs from that
of the official public identity.21 Besides, minorities are often described as being ‘non-dominant’
groups that are not in a position of control or authority within a political community. Although the
term ‘minority’ may refer to different aspects, for my analysis of Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey I take
only ‘ethnic minorities’ into consideration.
According to Connor (1994) ethnicity is the most important factor for the definition of the
national identity. Thus, he refers to the term ‘ethno-nationalism’ instead of nationalism for
defining nationalist attitude. Thus, according to Connor’s approach, ethnicity remains the most
central and powerful element in the development of nationalism. The term ‘ethnicity’ is explained
as a perception in definition of ‘ethno-nationalism’. Connor (1994) stresses the subjective and
psychological quality of this perception, rather than its objective ‘substance’.22 More generally,
20
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‘identity does not draw its sustenance from facts but from perceptions, perceptions are as
important or more than reality when it comes to ethnic issues’.23
The concept of the ‘ethnic minority’ depends on the perception within the state as well.
Kylimca (2004) gives two different understanding of minority in different states; ‘a challenge for
national security’ and ‘a quest for the justice and fairness’. In the case of oldest European Union
member states, although the term minority refers to a matter of ‘justice’; it is mostly a ‘security’
matter in Central and Eastern Europe.24 Apparently, after the Cold War, compared to the Western
Europe, Central and Eastern European states used to have security deficit. Both the EU and NATO
have a deep stake in the peace and stability of the Central and Eastern states which led to the
2004 accession. The strengthening of the EU contributed greatly towards the construction of a
Europe where all states share basic values and norms of democratic governance, market economy
and rule of law. Thus, EU succeeded in attracting the states of this region that are often described
as authoritarian, which in turn relates to their Soviet past. While most of the Central and Eastern
European states “consistently aimed towards European integration” to solidify their economic and
political status as liberal democracies, they first had to reconcile Western European norms
regarding the protection of minority rights with their own laws and standards. 25
In the literature, analysis of ‘Europeanization’ of Central and Eastern Europe generally
focuses on the interplay of contemporary international and domestic conditions. The ‘external
incentives model’ that provide an explanation for this process suggests that the adoption of
democratic and human rights norms as well as EU legal norms depends on the size and credibility
23
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of tangible, material incentives provided by external actors as well as on the political costs that
target governments occur when adopting and implementing these rules domestically
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005).
Many of these countries that used to belong to the Iron Curtain have problems with
democratic ideals. Therefore, adoption of the rules about the protection of minorities required by
documents like the EU’s Copenhagen criteria and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities is not easy. In addition to these difficulties, Central and
Eastern European states face the dilemmas existing within the Union itself about minority
protection policies. Rechel (2008) lists these problems within the European Union’s minority rights
policy itself as the lack of minority rights standards within the EU; superficial monitoring of
candidate states; more concern for regional stability rather than for actual minority protections;
and the double standard that require Central and Eastern European states to adopt minority rights
policy while Western European states were not required to previously. 26
Despite these problems within the Union, the literature about the ‘Europeanization’ of
minority rights generally points out the success in the states of Central and Eastern Europe.
Vachudaova (2005) states that many of the scholars agree that the EU insistence on minority
protection led to the improved treatment of ethnic minorities in Eastern and Central Europe as
one of the most vivid cases of successful EU conditionality. 27 Similarly, Schwellnus et al (2009)
make a cross-country analysis of the formal adoption and sustainability of minority protection
rules in four new EU member states that are namely Poland, Romania, Estonia, and Latvia over a
twelve-year period including pre- and post-accession phases (1997-2008). Their results show a
clear distinction of the developments in five minority protection related issue areas between pre
26
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and post accession periods of these countries. However, the study of Schwellnus et al (2009)
reveals that the impact of Europeanization on the minority protection policies of the new
members is considered as successful but with limitations.
Before their accession many concerns existed about the implementation of minority rights
policy or its possible effect on strengthening nationalist oriented parties in Central and Eastern
European states.28 Due to the requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria and the necessity to
ensure protection of minority rights to obtain EU membership, countries such as Latvia and
Estonia have now adopted some citizenship, language, and educational legislation directed
towards their Russian minorities; Hungary and Slovakia have been directed to address issues such
as discrimination, education, and poverty in their own minority Roma population; and Romania
has pursued efforts to improve the educational and cultural restrictions on its Hungarian
minority.29 It is interesting to note that the pressure that the EU placed on the governments of
Romania and Slovakia was probably the most intense of all, considering violence going on in the
Balkans. Negotiating processes actually led to the agreements that are respectful of the ethnic
minorities in Romania, Slovakia and Hungary.30 The position of the Roma in the Czech Republic
and of ethnic Russians in the Baltic States improved because these states were required to
regularize their treatment of minorities in order to join the European Union.31
2.1.3. Approaches explaining EU’s impact
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Approaches for explaining Europeanization of member/candidate states emphasizing can
be grouped around two theoretical approaches that draw on different strands of neoinstitutionalist reasoning: rationalist institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism (Börzel
2005; Börzel and Risse 2003; Cowles et al. 2001). Rationalist institutionalism suggests that the EU’s
domestic impact follows ‘logic of consequences ’rather than a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March
and Olsen 1989). The pressure for adoption of the policies from the EU changes the opportunity
structure for utility-maximizing domestic actors. It empowers certain actors by offering legal and
political resources to pursue domestic change. Formal domestic institutions and significant
domestic institutions are the main factors impeding or facilitating changes in response to EU
adjustment pressures. By contrast, constructivist institutionalism emphasizes that such responses
follow ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March 1994). The EU’s domestic impact results from a process of
socialization in which domestic actors internalize the EU norms. According to Sedelmeier (2011)
the domestic norm entrepreneurs, as well as the normative resonance between EU rules and
domestic cultural understandings and informal institutions, are key mediating factors explaining
the engagement of domestic actors in a social learning process through which EU rules redefine
their interests and identities.
Rational Institutionalism
Rational Institutionalism (Rational Choice) is a theoretical approach, which argues that the
political actors use institutions to maximize their utility under the rule-based constraints of the
institutional environment, which influence their behavior (Hall and Taylor 1996). Rational Choice
Institutionalism assumes that political actors within the institutional setting have their own set of
preferences, thus they behave by making strategic cost-benefit calculation (Hall and Taylor 1996).
According to Hall and Taylor (1996), the institutions define the rules of the game, and the range
of available strategies. Thus, the institutional environment provides the information that
18

reduces uncertainty for each actor about the corresponding behavior of others (Hall and Taylor
1996).
Rationalist institutionalism focuses on the EU’s use of conditionality to influence candidate
countries (Hall and Taylor 1996). Rationalist approaches discard processes of socialization and
persuasion as a mechanism for the EU’s domestic impact. However, the constructivist
institutionalism can also analyze this process. According to the social constructivist model, the
governments thus adopt the EU’s rules regardless of the material incentives that the EU might
offer for doing so (Sedelmeier 2011). Thus, for this research I assume that application of a
constructivist approach is not fruitful for the analysis of either the most recent members from
Central and Eastern European states or the candidates, whose priority is the ultimate reward of EU
membership. At that point, for the analysis of the minority protection policies, comparative
analysis of EU rule adoption in Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey requires rational institutionalist
explanation. The nature of the research and the research question can better be analyzed by
adopting the rationalist external incentives model, which shows the relationship between
Europeanization and domestic policies. Table 2.1 below depicts the key independent variables
analyzed as explanatory variables for the effectiveness of the EU’s influence.
Table 2.1. Conceptual Framework for Rational Institutionalism32
Rational Institutionalism
EU Strategy

Conditionality

External Factors

clarity of EU demands
∙ credibility of conditionality
(including consistency of application, and intraEU consensus on rewarding compliance)

32
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∙ size of rewards and power
asymmetry
∙ temporal proximity of rewards
∙ linkages to Western Europe
∙ monitoring capacity
Domestic Factors

. domestic costs of adopting
rules for governments (for
political conditions:
–party system (liberal/illiberal)
– quality of political competition at moment of
regime change
– ethnic policy preferences in
parliament; more generally:
– veto players
– internationalization of policy
sector)
∙ societal mobilization
∙ supportive formal institutions
∙ administrative capacities

EU membership as an external incentive
As discussed before, the rationalist external incentive is the model that matches better
with the nature of the research question of this analysis, because the model clearly sets the
ultimate goal or the reward for the candidate/member states. Clarity means that the candidate
states know what they need to do if they decide to comply with the EU rules and conditions. It
applies both to whether a certain issue area is included in the EU’s conditionality and what
particular rules the candidates need to adopt in order to become member states (Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier 2005). Uncertainty might stem from evolving rules in the EU, such as the
Schengen acquis (Grabbe 2003, 2005) or from the absence of a single EU model in many policy
20

areas. Uncertainty also arises from internal conflict within the Commission and among the
member states about the application of conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005).
The application of conditionality requires that the candidates must be certain that they
will receive the promised reward, that is, EU membership after meeting the EU’s demands. Yet
they also must believe that they will only receive the reward if they fully meet the requirements.
Thus, credibility depends on a consistent, successful application of conditionality by the EU.33
According to Sedelmeier (2011) conditionality suffers if the EU makes candidate states doubt that
the EU will deliver the promised rewards as in the debates about the possible accession of Turkey,
thus making the credibility problematic. Credibility also suffers if candidates suspect that other
factors lead the EU to reward candidates who do not meet all the requirements, as in the cases of
Bulgaria, Romania, or Croatia (Sedelmeier 2011), especially after the EU set a date for their
accession (Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2007). The EU sought to overcome this problem in the
accession of Bulgaria and Romania by maintaining monitoring after accession. The credibility of
conditionality is also linked to the ability of the EU to monitor effectively the fulfillment of its
requirements. 34 Especially in the case of Central and Eastern European enlargement, the EU has
made significant investment into its monitoring capacity.
Domestic factors
Rationalist institutionalism also specifies a number of factors at the domestic level that
mediate the EU’s influence to explain Europeanization process. These factors are in parallel with
the rationalist institutionalist argument that the EU’s influence works through empowering
domestic actors that benefit from EU legislation (Jacoby 2006; Kubicek 2003). Rationalist
33
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approaches to Europeanization suggest that in order to have influence; the EU needs to have
domestic allies in candidate countries (Jacoby 2006; Kubicek 2003).
As another domestic factor, the adjustment cost for target governments is also important.
The governments can expect benefits in domestic politics from adopting the EU rules in case of
low domestic adjustments. About the human rights and minority protection policies, Vachudova
(2005) and Schimmelfennig (2005) identify the presence of a liberal democratic government as a
key factor in which the major political parties agree on liberal reforms and integration into the
European Union, because for such governments, the costs of meeting the EU’s demands are not
high. More specifically, Kelley (2004b) relates the domestic costs with regard to the EU’s demands
for minority rights as the presence of authoritarian leaders, or the dominance of nationalists in the
parliament. The number of veto players in a policy area is a key facilitating factor as well
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). In turn, the number of actors opposed to the EU’s
demands is likely to be low if a policy area does not have strong institutional setting (Hughes et al.
2004).
Adjustment costs are not the only domestic factors explaining Europeanization. Other
examples from the literature suggest that the alignment of candidate states might not only
depend on their domestic adjustments costs, but also on their administrative capacities. Toshkov
(2008) provides evidence that both government capacities and political preferences have a strong
effect on the transposition of EU law in the candidate states. Furthermore, other studies pointed
to the importance of administrative capacities to argue that the effective implementation of EU
rules in candidate countries require both strong states and strong civil societies that have the
capacity to mobilize (Dimitrova 2010; Sissenich 2007, 2010; Börzel 2010; Börzel and Buzogany
2010; Sedelmeier 2008).
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2.1.4. Explanatory Model of Europeanization
External Incentives Model
The external incentives model, which is based on rationalist approach focuses on the size
and speed of rewards, credibility of conditionality as well as significant domestic institutions and
domestic costs of adaptation (Cowles et al. 2001). Accordingly, the external incentives model
requires EU conditionality in which the EU sets its rules as conditions that the target states have to
fulfill in order to receive EU rewards. 35 The starting point of the external incentives model is the
misfit between European and domestic processes, policies and institution (goodness of fit) which
puts adaptation pressure on states (Cowles et al. 2001, Börzel and Risse, 2000). The model
assumes that the EU conditionality challenges the domestic status quo by providing incentives for
rule adoption and changes the domestic opportunity structure. 36
According to Vachudova (2006), the model allows EU to use the threat of exclusion from the
next stage of the process on candidate countries that are not fulfilling the required reforms, and
then rewards states depending on the progress in complying with the EU laws and conditions.
Therefore, the major assumption of the external incentives model of conditionality is that “a state
complies with the norms of the EU if the benefits of the rewards exceed the domestic adoption
costs and the level of credibility of incentives is high.” 37 In sum, this cost-benefit balance depends
on the size and credibility of the rewards, on the one hand, and the size of domestic adoption
costs, on the other (Cowles et al. 2001).
2.1.6 Modeling Europeanization: An Application of External Incentives Model
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There are a number of factors that plausibly affect compliance in the European Union as
discussed before. For the analysis of the minority protection policies of three case studies of
Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey, I apply Cowles et al. (2001)’s rationalist external incentives model,
which shows the interaction between the domestic factors and Europeanization process under the
impact of membership conditionality, thus capable of testing my hypotheses related (See Figure
2.2).
I conceptualize the domestic factors that might facilitate or even in itself sufficiently cause
rule adoption through three different conditions: first, the government position, whose policy
preferences can be either in favor of (in the case of a government with a pro-minority orientation
or under inclusion of the minorities themselves), indifferent or opposed to minority protection
measures (the latter in case of nationalists forming or taking part in the government); second, the
existence of significant institutions that might block either positive proposals or the attempted
revocation of existing rules depending on their policy preferences; third, mobilization of the
minorities, which can be interpreted as an indicator of the salience as well as possible financial
costs of minority protection. These factors will be further specified below in the part dealing with
the conceptualization of the independent variables.
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Figure 2.2. Model of Europeanization of Minority Policies in Member States38

Main Hypotheses and Variables
The main hypothesis based on the external incentive model is that; ‘a state resist adopting
the norms of the EU if the domestic adoption costs exceed the benefits of the rewards and level of
credibility of incentive is low’. The external incentive model proposes two factors which have
impact on resistance to comply with EU requirements: EU incentives and domestic factors.
The dependent variable of the study is ‘rule adoption’. For ‘rule adoption’, I follow the
description of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) that names the dependent variable as
‘formal rule adoption’. This adoption refers to change (positive or negative) in rule adoption
compared to the previous status quo at any given point in time. Formal rule adoption ‘consists in
the transposition of EU rules into national law or the establishment of formal institutions and
38
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procedures in line with EU rules.’ 39 Formal rule adoption is a decision taken at the political level
and most often consists in the passing of legislation.
The conceptualization of independent variables
The position of the governments:
The likelihood of adoption decreases with net political or power costs of governments
from fulfilling the EU requirements. Political actors in the candidate states calculate whether the
rewards offered by the EU are worth the costs of adaptation. The size of domestic adoption costs,
in this sense, determines whether they will accept or reject the conditions. When the political
costs of compliance are high for the target government, that is, when fulfilling EU conditions
threatens the security or integrity of the state, or the survival of the regime or the government’s
domestic power base, and its core political practices for power preservation, even credible
membership incentives turns out to be ineffective. 40 Vachudova (2006) shows that, although EU
began to implement the conditionality of the pre-accession process, it had little success in
changing domestic policies in illiberal democracies in the Western Balkans where ‘governments
turned their backs on the benefits of EU membership to protect their power, autonomy and rentseeking opportunities.’ 41
In terms of Europeanization of minority policies, policy preferences of a government can
be either in favor of adopting EU standards for minority protection if the government has a prominority orientation and/or includes representatives from minorities within the government. As
the adoption of rules do not bring high adoption cost at the domestic level for the government,
the adoption of the EU rules are likely. On the other hand, in case of a government with
39
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nationalists taking part and/or with a nationalist orientation, the likelihood of the government to
postpone the adoption of minority protection due to the fear of political failure in elections is
high. The nationalist oriented parties are generally based on single-ethnic platform that
constitute the majority of the population in a state. Typically, the nationalist oriented parties are
right-wing and oppose rights and recognition of minorities.
According to Kelley (2004a, 2004b), the inclusion of minority parties representing an
ethnic group on the one hand and right-wing pro-nation parties on the other in government is an
important factor in determining the state policy towards minorities and the reaction to external
demands to protect minorities. Coalition governments with the inclusion of parties representing
national minorities are likely to be willing to implement minority rights, unlike governments with a
strong nationalist influence are likely to resist this. The straight-forward rationale behind this
intuitive hypothesis is that political decisions follow directly the policy preferences of the ruling
decision-makers.

H#1: Existence of pro-minority parties (or even minority parties) in government or coalition is
positively associated with rule adoption in minority protection policies.

H#2: Existence of nationalist parties in government or coalition is negatively associated with rule
adoption in minority protection policies.
Significant Institutions
At the domestic level, there are various institutions that contribute to the process of
Europeanization in the field of minority protection either positively or negatively. These
institutions may include political, judicial, or even military institutions, depending on the state
analyzed. According to Tsebelis (2002), ‘the difficulty for a significant change of the status quo
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increases in general with the number of veto players and with their distances.’

42

Veto player

theory predicts increasing policy stability with a higher number of veto players, because it
becomes increasingly likely that a change from the status quo will be blocked.
Compliance with the EU requirements therefore becomes a challenge if there is a high
number of veto players who are institutionalized in domestic structures with vested interests in
protecting the old normative order (Sedelmeier 2011). Thus, when Europeanization process
threatens the interest of these forces or limits their autonomy, the costs of rule adoption would be
too high, and Europeanization would not be supported by these institutions.
In terms of the analysis of the minority protection policies, to be able to compare the three
cases, and test the hypotheses equally, instead of focusing on the number of veto players affective
in the process, as required by the veto players theory, I make an in-depth analysis of significant
institutions that exist in all three cases. Thus, I consider Presidents and Constitutional Courts to be
two significant institutions to be analyzed as domestic factors to have impact on the process of
Europeanization. Depending on their policy preferences, these institutions might either block
positive proposals or attempt to revoke existing rules or support the required change.

H#3 Existence of significant institutions with policy preferences contrary to those of the EU on
minority protection is negatively associated with rule adoption in minority protection policies.

H#4 Existence of significant institutions with policy preferences similar to those of the EU on
minority protection is positively associated with rule adoption in minority protection policies.
The mobilization of minorities:

42

George Tsebelis, Veto players: How Political Institutions Work, (NY: Princeton University Press,
2002),, 37.
28

Bottom-up mobilization against reluctant governments is a central factor for compliance
research in the field of human rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999). It has been argued
that the lack of civil society and relatedly the ability to mobilize in favor of societal demands is
generally low in former-authoritarian Central and Eastern European countries, thus rule adoption
is mainly government-driven (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006). Large and well
organized minority groups can be expected to be much more able to exert pressure on
governments than small and poorly organized ones. To be able to measure the concept of
‘minority mobilization’, I consider two indicators: (1) the size of the ethnic minority group, which is
the percentage of the overall population and (2) the number of organizations founded on the
grounds of protection of ethnic minorities and lobbying for their cultural and political rights and
recognition, which do not directly measure mobilization but indicate the capability of a minority
group to do so.

H#5: Existence of large ethnic minorities in a state with domestic organizations representing their
rights is positively associated with rule adoption in minority protection policies.

H#6: Existence of small ethnic minorities in a state without domestic organizations representing
their rights is negatively associated with rule adoption in minority protection policies.
Selection of Independent Variables
Europeanization requires strong external incentives that are supported by favorable
domestic conditions. According to my assumption for the analysis, for Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey,
the EU membership is the strong incentive that can enforce changes at the domestic level. This is
based on the fact that Latvia and Bulgaria are former Soviet states of the Eastern Europe with the
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frequently expressed intention of becoming part of Western Europe since their foundation.
Turkey is another case with significant desire to accede to European Union since 1960s.
Although the ultimate goals of these states are taken as the EU membership, I expect the
domestic factors in these states to have impact in the negotiating as well. The domestic political
structure constitutes various factors, many of which are likely to have impact in a process of
change. To be able to trace the impact of each domestic variable in an in-depth analysis, I take
only three of them for the comparative study of Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey.
As the relationship between the European Union and the candidate/member state is
primarily in the agenda of the government during the negotiating process, ‘position of the
governments’ is an inevitable factors as a variable. Thus, when a new governing coalition places
pro-European actors, then the government would seem to be willing and able to move on a
number of important issues including the minority protection or vice versa. Without the support
of the governments, any change at the domestic structure is impossible.
On the other hand, the significant institutions, affective at the domestic level also have the
power and capability to either block or support the change at domestic structure. Thus,
compliance with the EU requirements therefore becomes a challenge if domestic structures have
various interests in protecting the old normative order. There are a number of significant
institutions that can be included in this list such as political elites, military and judiciary actors,
bureaucrats etc. The power and variety of the institutions can depend on the structure of the state
as well, which in turn requires a special attention for an in depth analysis in a research. Thus, in
order to measure the variables equally in each cases and a better comparative analysis, I limited
these bodies as two actors from both institutional and judicial background. The authority of the
President and the Constitutional Court over the governments and their ability to have impact on
the decisions of the governments are the reasons that make the significant institutions necessary
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variables for consideration in the analysis of the process of Europeanization in Latvia, Bulgaria and
Turkey.
A better understanding of the process of Europeanization of minority protection in a state
requires an analysis of the situation of that specific minority group as a domestic variable. An
organized and successful ethnic minority group can either support or oppose the position of the
governments and the significant institutions, which in turn may even lead to change in policy
preferences of these two actors. Thus, whereas the impact of ‘governments’ and ‘significant
institutions’ can be explained as ‘top-down’ approach within the domestic structure, ‘mobilization
of minorities’ constitute the bottom-up dimension of this process. To conceptualize the term
‘mobilization’ for a better measurement, I consider two indicators, namely the size of ethnic
minorities in the target state, and the number of domestic organizations serving for rights of that
ethnic group. Thus, I expect a large ethnic group with support through human rights organizations
to be able to counter the unfavorable stand from both the governments and the significant
institutions.
In the next section, I will explain the details of the methodology by introducing the
rationale behind choosing my research design, how to test the hypotheses, the importance of case
selection and the set of criteria that lead me to select Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey as case studies
for conducting a cross-country analysis of Europeanization of minority protection policies.
2.2.

Research Design, Case Selection and Methodology
2.2.1. Research Design

The research design is a ‘comparative case study’ which is equipped with a strong
theoretical background and an extensive empirical analysis. This type of comparison has also been
referred to as ‘case-oriented’ since the state is the unit of analysis, and the aim is to test
hypotheses for differences or similarities between states in order to generate a deeper
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understanding of a topic.43 Comparing three cases that share similar features but have different
political outcomes (Most Similar Systems Design –MSSD) allows me to figure out the common
elements from diverse states that have greater explanatory power for outcome. This system is
based on Mill’s method of agreement which seeks to identify those features that are same among
different countries in an effort to account for a particular outcome (Landman 2008). (See Table
2.2 )
Table 2.2. Comparison of Basic Facts across Three Cases44
LATVIA

BULGARIA

TURKEY

2.3 million (2012)

7.6 million (2012)

79.4 (2012)

GDP per capita

$18,600 (2012)

$14,500 (2012)

$15,200 (2012)

Religion

Lutheran 19.6%,

Eastern Orthodox

Muslim 99.8%

Orthodox 15.3%,

59.4%,

(mostly Sunni),

other Christian 1%

Muslim (Sunni)

other 0.2% (mostly

unspecified 63.7%

7.4%, Muslim (Shia)

Christians and

(2006 census)

0.4%, others

Jews) (2012

(including Catholic,

estimated)

Population

Protestant,
Armenian Apostolic
Orthodox, and
Judaism) 1.7%,
other (unknown)
27.4%, none 3.7%
(2011 census)
Capital
Official Languages

Riga

Sofia

Ankara

Latvian, Liv

Bulgarian

Turkish
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Todd Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics. (London: Routledge 2008),28.
Sources: “Member Countries”, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries,
accessed July 2nd 2013 ; “The World Factbook”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook, accessed July 2nd, 2013.
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Government Type

Parliamentary

Parliamentary

Parliamentary

Democracy

Democracy

Democracy

Legal System

Civil Law

Civil Law

Civil Law

Independence

1991

1878

1923

Year of EU candidacy

1998

1997

1999

Year of EU Accession

2004

2007

Still candidate

Case study method provides a richer empirical analysis and more accurate description and
explanation of the phenomenon in question, and thus also contributes to theory-testing in the
social sciences (Babbie et al. 2007, Flick 2006). For the analysis of the cases, this research employs
a traditional linear approach which follows a hypothetical-deductive strategy. This forms a linear
process where specific hypotheses are derived from the external incentives model, with data then
collected and tested in relation to those hypotheses (Babbie et al. 2007, Flick 2006). Focusing on
domestic factors, such as position of governments, significant institutions and mobilization of
minorities as the independent variables in explaining adoption of minority protection policies of
the EU, I derive hypotheses from the external incentives model. Thus, in general the research is
designed as theory-testing case studies to assess the domestic conditions of effective incentive
(EU membership), and to determine which of them are necessary or sufficient Europeanization of
minority policies in the target countries that are Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey.
The independent variables constitute the domestic conditions and are organized as a
simple model which exemplifies the impact of domestic conditions on Europeanization patterns of
countries. For each case, a similar basic template is used, which begins with initial conflict and
different issues of minority protection violations in the target country, and then turns to European
demands and conditions. The analysis finalizes with the outcome part, where the rule adaption
patterns of states are analyzed.
2.2.2. Case Selection
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A strategic selection of cases is necessary for a research in order to test the hypotheses and
reach to generalizable results. 45 Case selection therefore is an important part of a good research
strategy to achieve well-defined objectives of the study. Hence the primary criteria for case
selection is whether it has relevance to the research objective of the study, that is theory testing,
and provides rich opportunities for improving understanding of the primary phenomena or
processes under research.46
The case selection for this research follows two criteria. The first one is significant conflict
between EU rules and the initial situation about the minority protection issues in the
candidate/member state. I select ‘hard cases’ for the methodological reason that the democratic
conditionality and its effects are more easily observable than in ‘easy cases’. I will be able to learn
more about the conditions of its effectiveness and ineffectiveness since the challenge to
conditionality is higher in cases of significant conflict.47 The second criterion of case selection is
the size of minorities. For a better analysis, I select cases with size of ethnic minorities greater than
15% of ethnic minorities within whole population. Table below summarizes the size of ethnic
minorities in the selected cases.
Table 2.3. Total Population and the Percentage of Ethnic Minorities48

Country

Population (million) *

45

Percentage of
Minorities
in
Population *

Ethnic
overall

Alexander L George, and Andrew Bennet. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 83.
46
Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Designs and methods, (UK: Sage Publications, 2003), 34.
47
Frank Schimmelfenning et al. “Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU
Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey”, Journal of Common Market Studies
41:3, (2003): 501.
48
Sources: “The EU Countries”, accessed January 10 2012,
http://europa.eu/abouteu/countries/index_en.htm;
“CIA World Fact Book”, accessed January 10 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/
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LATVIA

2.3

Russian 27.8%
Belarusian 3.6%
Ukrainian 2.5 %
Polish 2.4 %
Lithuanian 1.3 %

BULGARIA

7.6

TURKEY

79.4

Turk 9.4 %
Roma 4.7 %
Others 2 %
Kurds 18 %
Others 7 %

2.2.3. Methodological Considerations and Data Collection
I complement the analysis of conditions and compliance with a process-tracing analysis
through examining the histories, official documents, and other sources to “trace the links between
possible causes and observed outcomes.”

49

Process tracing is an indispensable tool of theory-

testing, which attempts to identify the intervening casual relation between an independent
variable and the dependent variable. 50 It allows analyzing the effect of different independent
variables and the effect of variance in the independent variables across cases.51 Taken together,
these methods ensure to better assess which domestic factors really matter for adoption of
minority protection policies under EU conditionality.
In order to measure the adoption of democratic conditions of EU as the dependent
variable, I primarily focus on analysis of official EU documents. The core of the empirical research
consist the analysis of official documents. These documents are European Commission’s annual
progress reports, Accession Partnership Documents and National Programs for Adoption of

Acquis, Commission’s DG Enlargement reports and European Commission’s Mechanism for
Cooperation and Verification (CVM) and daily news services which allows keeping close track the
demands of the EU and reactions of the target governments. In addition to primary (official
49

George and Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development, 6.
Ibid, 206.
51
Ibid, 75-81.
50

35

documents, speeches, press releases) sources, the analysis relies on the rich collection of
secondary sources (academic literature).
The European Commission’s annual progress reports, Accession Partnership Documents
and National Programs for Adoption of Acquis, Commission’s DG Enlargement reports are annual
strategy documents explaining the policy on EU enlargement and report the political and
economic developments in each candidate or potential candidate country. In general, the reports
assess the ability of the candidate states to transpose and implement EU legislation and the
progress of the candidate countries in adopting EU standards and in fulfilling other specific
conditions. For the analysis of Europeanization of minority protection policies, these official
reports are utilized for each case study.
2.2.4. Limits of Comparative Analysis
There are some limitations of this comparative analysis. Initially, Europeanization is still an
ongoing process for all three cases. However, both Latvia (2004) and Bulgaria (2007) have already
become member states while Turkey is still a candidate. Thus, it is not completely accurate to
compare the Europeanization in all three cases. Secondly, all three cases have different historical
backgrounds in terms of length of democracy. Yet another issue that makes a comparison
between Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey somewhat problematic concerns the differences in the
Europeanization experiences of the three countries. Turkey’s relations with Europe dates back to
1950s. Turkey has been treated as a credible candidate since the 1980s. The Helsinki Summit of
the European Council in 1999 offered Turkey the concrete prospect of full membership, more
than four decades after its application for association with the European Economic Community in
1959. This put general project of Westernization into a different and more concrete context of
Europeanization. Thus, a strong identification with Europe has been and is a core feature of
modern Turkey. On the other hand, Bulgaria is a former communist state whose relationship with
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the EU dates back to 1990s. Latvia is also a former Soviet state that has gained democratic
independence only in 1990s.
Thirdly, compared to other two cases, Turkey has a significantly larger overall population.
Whereas Turkey has a population of 79 million, Latvia has 2.3 million, Bulgaria has 7.6 million.
Although, in this study I take percentage of ethnic minorities into consideration, this large
difference among three cases in terms of population is a limitation of the study.
Despite all these limitations, it should be noted that the differences between three cases
are also advantageous for an enriched, in-depth comparative analysis. Since the main question of
this dissertation is whether domestic factors matters for Europeanization of minority policies, it is
relevant to compare Turkey, Bulgaria and Latvia that have significant problems with the ethnic
minority population.
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CHAPTER 3
LATVIA: ETHNIC RUSSIANS52
Latvia had been under Soviet occupation for half a century until its independence in 1991.
This strong influence of the authoritarian heritage impacted the policies leading to suppression of
different identities. However, with the fall of the Soviet regime and the independence of Latvia in
1991, Latvia's focus has been both the fear of losing Latvian identity and joining the European
Union. Addressing the nationalist standing of the governments, significant institutions, and the
mobilization of the suppressed ethnic Russians, I argue that, the lessons learned from the Latvian
case point to a more general conclusion about the relationship between domestic factors and
Europeanization.
3.1. Loss of ‘Latvian identity’ in Soviet Era
Latvia is a small Baltic state with a population of approximately 2.3 million people.
Although Latvia originally gained its independence in 1918, during and after the Second World
War Latvia lived under the occupation of the Soviet Union for half a century. Ethnic Latvians
represent approximately 58.2 percent of the population, and their mother tongue is the Latvian
language. The largest ethnic minorities are mostly Russian speaking and include Russians (27.8
percent), Belarusians (3.6 percent) and Ukrainians (2.5 percent). Ethnic groups representing less
than 2.5 percent of the population include Poles, Lithuanians, Roma and Estonians. 53
The history of minority related issues in Latvia was heavily influenced by the Soviet
occupation of Latvia. Similar to the other two Baltic States, Latvia was occupied by the Red Army
and was incorporated into the Soviet Union by 1940. However, a resistance movement against
52

Part of this chapter is previously published in Emel E. Tugdar, “Europeanization of Minority
Protection Policies in Latvia: EU Conditionality and the Impact of Domestic Factors on the Rights
of Ethnic Russians, CEU Political Science Journal 8:1, (2013): 31-53.
53
“Latvijas Statistika”, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, accessed November 13, 2013,
http://www.csb.gov.lv
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Soviet control continued for several years after the Second World War. By 1953, about 120,000
people had been killed, imprisoned or deported to labor camps in Siberia. Soviet population
policies during the Cold War caused major demographic shifts, with the number of Russianspeaking minorities within the country growing from around 33% during Cold War to 48% by the
end of the 1980s. 54 The proportion of ethnic Latvians in the country declined from 77 per cent in
1935 to 52 per cent by 1989. As a result of this, according to the 1989 census, Latvians had
become a minority in the eight largest cities. 55
As a result of this large demographic shift, the proportion of language usage had
significant changes. In the major cities of Latvia, the dominant language was Russian and
throughout all of Latvia, statistics show that while around 60 percent of Latvians knew Russian,
only 18 percent of non-Latvians knew the Latvian language.56 With regard to Soviet occupation,
Latvian ended up becoming a minority language by the end of the Cold War.
3.2 Post-Cold War Era and Latvian Independence
The implementation of Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika allowed
Latvia to declare its independence in 1989. Despite the objections from the Soviet authorities,
Latvia declared the renewal of its independence in 1990 and after a period of transition,
completed as of 1991 with a declaration of the full restoration of Latvian state authority. Both the
1990 declaration of restored Latvian independence and the declaration of de facto independence
proclaimed the authority of the 1922 constitution, thus stressing the continuity of
independence.57 (See Table 3.1)
54

David J. Galbreath, “The Politics of European Integration and Minority Rights in Estonia and
Latvia,” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 4:1 (2003): 37.
55
Judith G. Kelley, Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives, (NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2004a),73.
56
Ibid.
57
Daina Stukuls Eglitis, Imagining the Nation: History, Modernity and Revolution in Latvia.
(PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 110.
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Independence and the restoration of the old constitution brought significant changes to
the policies regarding minorities. With the regained independence, Latvia granted automatic
citizenship only to those residents who were citizens prior to the commencement of the Soviet
occupation in 1940 and their descendants. A large proportion of Latvia’s significant Russianspeaking minority were given Latvian citizenship. 58
Since 1999, Latvia's official languages have been the Latvian language and the Liv
language, the latter being an indigenous language close to extinction.59 Any other language used
in Latvia, especially Russian, was declared as a ‘foreign language’. The State Language Law of 1999
proposed ‘the preservation, protection and development of the Latvian language’, and ‘the
integration of national minorities into Latvian society’.60
3.3. Independence of Latvia and the Suppression of Russians
With the declaration of independence and reentry of the previous Constitution into force,
Latvia started seeking strict policies against the Russian-speaking minority. The reasons behind
this strictly controlled usage of language are related to the Latvian fear of losing ‘Latvian identity’.
61

. Initially, the major reason was the demographic fears of ethnic Latvians arising from half a

century of Soviet occupation. At the end of the Second World War, 83 percent of Latvia's
population was Latvians. However, during the Soviet occupation between 1940 and 1991, Latvia
experienced mass immigration from other Soviet territories, mostly ethnic Russians. Therefore,
Latvian percentage among the population of Latvia dropped to 52 percent by the end of the Cold
War and ethnic Latvians became almost a minority on their own land. 62
58

Eglitis, Imagining the Nation, 110.
Section 4 of the State Law states that “the State shall ensure the maintenance, protection and
development of the Liv language as the language of the indigenous (autochthon) population”.
60
Article 1. State Language Law adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Latvia in 1999.
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Eglitis, Imagining the Nation, 113.
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Boris Tsilevich, "The Development of the Language Legislation in the Baltic States,"
International Journal on Multicultural Societies 3:2 (2001): 137.
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In addition to the demographic reasons, Latvian control over the language was also a part
of ‘state-building’. 63 During the Soviet occupation of Latvia, Russian was approved as the official
language. The Latvian language was tolerated in the public sphere. However, although there was
no legal restriction for using Latvian language in the public sphere, Latvians faced insults directed
by the ethnic Russian population toward those who used Latvian in public places.
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The

nineteenth article of the 1977 Constitution asserts that the “Soviet state promotes the
intensification of the social ‘homogeneity’ of the society”. 65 The sblizheniye (drawing together)
policy of Soviet Russia, supported by the Constitution, ensured the dominance of the Russian
language.

66

With independence, the reassertion of the Latvian language in the public sphere

became vital as the language plays an important role as a symbol of the state. Therefore, the
status of the Russian language became an ‘unofficial’ language despite the significant percentage
of Russians among the whole population. Despite the fact that Russian-speaking minorities
accounted for approximately 29.2% of the population, while the Livonian language, which gained
an official language status, is the first language of approximately 200 speakers. 67
The third reason is the Latvian fear about identity, and specifically about the preservation
of a distinct Latvian culture. 68 The cultural landscape of Soviet Latvia allowed for a politically
passive population of Latvians with loose ethnic ties. Despite all suppressions, a strong Latvian
identity was still present in most of the families with a Latvian background. Therefore, the private
sphere allowed for the transfer of culture to younger generations. These cultural activities
63
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included celebration of Latvian holidays, family traditions, decorative art, folk dancing and ethnic
music.

69

The language is at the center of this cultural heritage. Therefore, usage of Latvian

language was of vital importance for reawakening the Latvian ‘identity’.
Finally, ethnic Latvians felt offended due to the comparatively adverse economic position
of ethnic Latvians to ethnic Russians, whose language dominated the economy and the
administration for decades. Soviet ‘equality’ in Soviet citizenship had privileged ethnic Russians in
terms of housing, jobs, language and power. 70 After independence, the law required employees
of the state and of all ‘institutions, enterprises, and institutes' to know sufficient Latvian to carry
out their profession. 71
Table 3.1. Timeline of Important Events in Latvia
Year

Political Event

1990

The Declaration of Independence

1991

Soviet Union collapses and Russian Federation
recognizes Latvia as sovereign state.

1994

Citizenship Law Adopted

1998

Official Candidacy of Latvia for the EU
membership

1999

Vaira Vīķe- Freiberga is elected as the first
woman president.

2003

Latvian European Union Membership
Referendum

69

Eglitis, Imagining the Nation, 26-7.
Ibid, 115.
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Article 6 of State Language Law adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Latvia in 1999.
70
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2004

Latvia became part of European Union and
NATO.

2006

New citizenship laws introduced requiring
people to have good knowledge of Latvian.

2006

Parties in coalition government led by Aigars
Kalvitis together won parliamentary majority in
general election.

2007

Prime Minister Kalvitis resigned, Ivars
Godmanis became the new prime minister.

2008

Latvian parliament approved European Union's
Lisbon Treaty

2009

Valdis Dombrovskis formed a new six-party
coalition government.

2009

Pro-Russian party Harmony Center secured win
in Riga municipal elections. Nils Ušakovs
became the first Russian to be Major of Riga.

2010

Dombrovskis formed government with Union of
Farmers and Greens

2011

The President Valdis Zatlers dissolved the
parliament

2011

The pro-Russian party “Harmony Center” won
the elections but failed to enter the leading
coalition as Dombrovskis forms a coalition
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government that excludes it.

2012

The referendum for Russian as the second
official language took place. Majority of voters
turned down the referendum.

3.4. European Union’s Pre-Accession Conditionality and Demands on the Minority
Protection and Human Rights Policies
Within the legal framework of the EU accession process, the European Commission is the
primary body of the European Union for monitoring of the pre-accession conditionality. In
accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union 72 the Commission presented its
Opinions on the applications for membership together, with Agenda 2000, an elaborated strategy
paper on the policies of the Union and the impact of enlargement, on 17 July 1997.
The relationship between the European Union and Latvia can be considered to be
relatively healthy compared to other candidate states during negotiations. Despite all of the other
conditions required for membership, human rights specifically minority rights and protection
issues, had the greatest potential to block the entry of Latvia into European Union. To sum up the
situation between the European Union and Latvia as of 1997, the Commission reported that in
Latvia ‘the non-citizens continue to be affected by various types of discrimination’.73
The main two factors that the European Union demanded for change in Latvia regarding
the minority policies were the naturalization process and the integration of minorities.
72

Article 49 of the EU Treaty defines the procedure for the accession of new states to the
European Union and explicitly recalls the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of
law agreed in Copenhagen.
73
“Agenda 2000: Commission Opinion on Latvia’s Application for Membership of the European
Union”, accessed November 16, 2012,
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/latvia/la-op_en.pdf,
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Concerning the fate of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia, the Commission concluded that
‘they have problems of accessing to certain professions in Latvia’.74 Furthermore, the Commission
observed that ‘the rate of naturalization of non-citizens has been slow in Latvia and recommended
the acceleration of this process ‘to ensure the integration of non-citizens’.75 Besides, the country
report for Latvia attributed these problems to the relative difficulty of the tests for naturalization,
the high enrolment fees of the examination, and the fact that non-possession of Latvian
citizenship may bring advantages such as not taking the duties of citizenship of military serving in
Latvia or easy entry to Russia. 76
3.4.1. The naturalization procedure
The naturalization process has been the concern of the European Union as it was directly
related to the ethnic Russians that constitute almost 29 percent of the whole population in Latvia.
The main problem the European Union declared to be the speed of naturalization process as
noted in the 1997 Commission Opinion.

77

According to the Commission report, this situation

could be attributable to a variety of factors including the restrictions in the 1994 Citizenship Law
as well as certain advantages of not possessing Latvian citizenship. 78
Another point that the Commission Opinion on Latvia criticized was the so called ‘window
system’, which restricted the right to apply for naturalization according to age brackets. The
system of age brackets, initially devised as a way of preventing the administration from being
overwhelmed by a flood of applications, had an inhibiting effect. The ‘window system’ limited
until 2003 the numbers of those who could apply for citizenship on the basis of age criteria and
74
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Union”, accessed November 16, 2012,
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/latvia/la-op_en.pdf,
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid.
45

gave priority to younger age groups.79 As of 31 August 1998 only about 10,260 persons had been
naturalized under the 1994 Citizenship Law. This means that of the 148,000 people eligible under
the first three ‘windows’ up to 1998, only around 6 percent have actually applied for citizenship. 80
After the publication of the European Commission’s Opinion in 1998, 3,669 people requested
citizenship in a year versus 2,572 during 1996.81 (See Figure 3.1) These numbers justified the
concerns of the European Commission that 1994 Citizenship Law is likely to bring advantages of
not possessing Latvian citizenship such as no military service obligation, and ease of travel to the
countries of the former USSR thanks to the old Soviet passport. 82
In addition to criticizing the ‘window system’, European Commission also pointed to the
situation of stateless children. 83 The Latvian authorities must consider ways to make it easier for
stateless children born in Latvia to become naturalized, in order that the European Convention on
Nationality concluded by the Council of Europe could be applied as soon as possible. 84
3.4.2. The social and political integration of ethnic minorities
Another point that the European Commission declared about minorities is the fact that
non-citizens are barred from certain occupations, as well as the lack of political participation,
even in local elections, and the poor protection of non-citizens’ fundamental rights. 85
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According to Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and in line with
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, states are under an obligation to grant citizenship to children born in their
territories who would otherwise be rendered stateless.
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Today, in Latvia, minorities, including non-citizens, account for nearly 44 percent of the
population, including 29 percent Russians, 4 percent Belarusians and 3 percent Ukrainians.
Latvians are a minority in seven of the country’s eight largest towns. 86 Within that 44%, 28% of
the population, i.e. some 685 000 people, do not have Latvian citizenship and a large proportion
of that group, consisting of former citizens of the USSR, have no citizenship at all. 87 The present
situation is largely attributable to the Soviet Union’s post-1945 policy of encouraging the
settlement of Russian-speakers. 88
Table 3.2. Ethnic Population in Latvia in Numbers89
ETHNIC
GROUP
Latvians
Russians
Belarusians
Ukrainians
Poles
Lithuanians
TOTAL

1989

2000

2011

1.387.757
905.515
119.702
92.101
60.416
34.630
2.666.567

1.370.703
703.243
97.150
63.644
59.505
33.430
2.377.383

1.285.136
557.119
68.202
45.798
44.772
24.479
2.070.371

Initially, non-citizens are barred from certain occupations. While some of these bars are
not unusual, such as in the case of civil service duties that have a bearing on national sovereignty,
others are far less comprehensible, such as lawyers, airline crews, fire-fighters, or pharmacists. In
addition, “non-citizens” cannot directly acquire ownership of land and have no right to vote, even
in local elections, even though that would be a powerful factor for encouraging integration.
Lastly, some of their fundamental rights are less well protected; they are, for example, excluded
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from the scope of the 1995 amnesty law. The European Commission asked Latvia to reduce these
differences as a part of pre-accession conditionality. 90
In regards to the problematic situation of the Russian-speaking minority, regardless of
whether they possess Latvian citizenship or not, the main criticism concerns the fact that Latvia
has not yet introduced legislation on education for the minorities which would provide a solid
framework for approaching this matter and planning for the medium term.

91

This sort of

situation provokes some fears among the minorities concerning the permanence of the measures
currently taken by the public authorities to promote their educational establishments.92 The 1995
amendment of the Education Act introduced the obligation for schools to increase the number of
lessons taught in Latvian. Also, in higher education, students have to pass a test in Latvian before
being admitted. 93
On the issue of ethnic languages, European Commission points to the facts that there exist
some obstacles for those who have no knowledge of Latvian such as the need to know Latvian to
receive unemployment benefit, and the obligation to pass a high-level language test to be able to
stand for election.94 Finally, the European Commission points out the fact that the minorities have
no special parliamentary representation. However, a Consultative Council of the Nationalities set
up in 1996 brings together the representatives of eleven ethnic minorities and is responsible for
monitoring the situation and proposing necessary reforms. On the cultural level, the Association
of National Cultural Societies, which spans some twenty organizations, strives to promote
tolerance and good relations between the various communities.95
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3.5. Analysis: Latvia’s Compliance with the ‘Acquis Communitaire’ on Minority Protection
This case study covers Latvia’s Europeanization process since Latvia became an official
candidate state for European Union membership in 1998 until its accession to the European Union
in 2004. I look at the influence of the ‘position of the government’, ‘significant institutions’ and
‘mobilization of minorities’ on the Europeanization of minority protection policies in Latvia.
3.5.1. The position of the government
Latvia is a parliamentary republic. The supreme legislative body is the Saeima (Parliament),
the 100 members of which are elected for a four-year term. The president is head of state,
however, executive power is held by the Cabinet of Ministers, which is headed by the prime
minister. The prime minister is appointed by the president based on parliamentary support; the
remaining members of the cabinet are nominated by the prime minister.
The statistics about the elections show that Latvian administrations since its independence
in 1991 have generally not been very long-lasting, as party coalitions shift, party lists disintegrate
and reform, and individual politicians change allegiances. 96 This unstable political environment of
Latvia has been effective on shaping the process of Europeanization of minority protection
policies in Latvia.
In the 1998 elections, Andris Skele’s newly formed center-right party called People's Party
(TP), Latvian Way, and Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement came
first, second and third. However, due to conflicts and scandals, these parties were not able to put
together a coalition government. The period 1998-2000 saw the collapse of two governments
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before the four-party coalition of Andris Bērziņš (Latvian Way) was installed. 97 (See Table 3.3 for
parties and ideologies in Latvia)
Table 3.3. Major Political Parties and Their Ideologies in Latvia 98
Name

Abbreviation

Ideology

Harmony Center

SC

Pro-Russian Minority Party

National Alliance

NA

Right-wing

Union of Green and Farmers

ZZS

Center

Latvia's First Party/Latvian Way

LPP/LC

Center-right

Zatlers' Reform Party

ZRP

Center-right

For Human Rights in United

PCTVL

Left-wing

V

Center-right

Latvia
Unity

In terms of the minority protection policies, the 1998 amendments to Latvia’s citizenship
law were the clearest indication of the effectiveness of minority rights conditionality of the EU
during the center-right coalition led by Andris Bērziņš.
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Obviously, the amendments were

primarily due to external pressures in other words EU conditionality. After submitting its EU
membership application in 1995, Latvia was excluded from accession talks at the end of 1997,
given the slow progress of naturalization.100 With the support from Latvian Way and oppose from
Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement, both of which formed the
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coalition, Latvian government succeeded in passing the amendment on the Citizenship Law, which
signified a positive attempt towards integration of minorities, especially Russians. This big
development in Latvian politics brought the end of the window system and the inclusion of
stateless children born after 21 August 1991, and Latvia simplified the naturalization process for
its then 700,000 non-citizens provided that they can write and talk in the state language and know
the country’s constitution and history.101 (Figure 3.1. shows the significant change in the
naturalization rates after 1998)
The European Commission’s annual progress reports stated European Union’s satisfaction
with the new amendments. These decisions of the government were important in order to speed
up the citizenship and naturalization procedures, in response to recommendations in the 1997
Commission Opinion, which were given as a significant step for accession. Besides, the
amendments approved by Parliament were put to a referendum in October. In the referendum,
53% voted in favor of the liberalization of the Citizenship Law. 102 The changes approved in the
referendum are expected to facilitate an acceleration of the naturalization process, which would
allow for the further development of an integrated Latvian society.103 The 53 percent approval for
these changes in a referendum signaled significant public support. However, the reason behind
the ‘yes’ vote would be likely to come from the desire to join the EU and NATO rather than
general realization that resident Russians must be accepted.
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Figure 3.1. Naturalization Rates in Latvia104
Number of persons acquired citizenship through naturalization

2004

16064

2003

10049

2002

9844

2001

10637

2000

14900

1999
1998

12427
4439

In regard to the integration of the minorities, Commission reports pointed to some of the
attempts of the government to abolish restrictions in the area of employment. As of 1998, the
government abolished the restrictions on non-citizens against working as fire-fighters, airline
staff, pharmacists and veterinary pharmacists.105 However, other restrictions continued to be
problem for professional employment as pilot, and army. The knowledge of the ‘official’ Latvian
language remained to be sufficient for employment which brought the minorities two options; to
join the Latvian language program under the National Program for the Integration of Society that
was developed in order to accelerate the ‘integration’ process; or to remain unemployed, which
requires knowledge of the Latvian language in order get employment benefits. 106
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Although the developments, especially in the field of employment were appreciated by
the European Union, the Latvian parliament amended the Language Law in July 1999 in a way that
can be interpreted as an intention to reverse Soviet-era policies. (See Table 3.3) With virtually
unanimous support from the four parties comprising the new governing coalition (People’s Party,
Latvia’s Way, and the FF/LNNK coalition), the law demanded those working in the service sector,
both employees and the self-employed must know and use the state language to the extent
necessary to perform their duties. 107
Despite these positive developments, the Law adopted could not sufficiently integrate
standards of proportionality and still considered the mandatory use of the state language in the
private sector that was problematic for the exercise of rights and freedoms guaranteed under the
Europe Agreement, such as the exercise of business activities for enterprises from the European
Union.108 Thus, the progress report was a declaration of a demand of revision from Latvian
government. Due to external pressure, newly-elected President Vaira Vike-Freiberga returned the
language law to parliament for reconsideration. She criticized the law for going against Latvia’s
constitution and international commitments as well as for lacking legal precision, the Parliament
approved a revised law in December 1999 taking into account Vike-Freiberga’s criticisms.109
The national election in 2000 brought a four-party coalition. The President Andris Berzins’
four-party coalition lasted until parliamentary elections in October 2002. However, this coalition
was not able to bring significant developments in the field of minority protection. Nonetheless,
the European Commission pointed to the law on Television and Radio, which holds that all films to
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be shown on television were required to be in the state language or have Latvian subtitles. 110
Besides, the Election Law prescribes language requirements for Members of Parliament. Several
other elements limiting the integration of non-citizens still persist in the economic sphere as the
non-citizens still not allowed practicing some professions such as lawyer, armed security guard,
and private detective on the grounds of state security. 111
Despite these criticism, European Commission report of 2000, showed support for the
policies of Latvian government in the Education Law of 1998 that brought the transition to
bilingual education.

According to the law, teachers working at minority schools had to

demonstrate a certain level of proficiency in Latvian. As of 2004, all state funded schools would
provide secondary education (from 10th grade onwards) in the state language only. Minority
education would continue to be available at public schools until 9th grade only. 112 In June 2001,
amendments to the Administrative Violations Code were adopted, which stipulated fines for
eleven different violations related to the implementation of the Language Law, with fines up to €
447 (250 LVL).113 On the issue of citizenship, Latvian governments followed restrictive policies as
well. Although, Latvia signed the European Convention on Nationality, several reservations on
certain aspects related to the acquisition of Latvian citizenship was introduced.114
Prior to the 2002 elections, two new parties entered the stage: New Era (JL) and Latvia
First Party (LPP). Both advocated the fight against corruption and came first and fourth in the
110
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elections. The New Era Party gained the most seats and formed a four-party coalition government.
The outcome of the 2002 elections thus seemed to be a direct response to public demand that
Latvia develop a new era in its politics. However, this coalition was not successful at making
significant changes about the minority issues as it failed to ratify the Council of Europe Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities115 and the Framework Convention.116
Due to this perspective of the government, Latvia faced cases in the European Court of
Human Rights as well. In April 2002, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Latvia had
violated the rights of Latvian citizen of Russian origin, who had not been allowed to stand as a
candidate in the 1998 parliamentary elections due to an alleged insufficient knowledge of the
official language, despite the fact that the candidate had previously presented the required
language proficiency certificate. 117 (See Table 3.4) As Latvia violated the right if its citizen to
become a candidate in a free election, the Court ordered Latvia to pay € 9000. At the same time,
the European Court of Human Rights also found that the purpose of the legislation on
parliamentary elections barring citizens without an advanced degree of proficiency in the national
language from standing for election was to ensure the proper functioning of the Latvian
institutional system.118
Table 3.4. European Court of Human Rights (9 April 2002) 119
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Case: Podkolzina v. Latvia (9 April 2002)

Decision

Ingrida Podkolzina, a member of the Russian-speaking minority in
Latvia, complained that the removal of her name from the list of
candidates for parliamentary elections on the ground that she had an
inadequate command of Latvian, the official language of Latvia,
infringed her right to stand as a candidate in elections.

Violation of Article 3
of Protocol No. 1
(right to free
elections)

The next government approved by the Latvian Parliament (Saeima) in 2004 with the
support of leftist parties, was a minority government led by Greens and Farmers Union leader
Indulis Emsis. Although the left wing parties are expected to be in favor of policy for the rights of
minorities, the main focus of this new government was Latvia's entry into NATO and the European
Union, both of which took place in the first half of 2004. Although Latvia ended up with getting
the ultimate incentive which is European Union membership as of 2004, the governments serving
before and during the accession were still reported to be difficult in complying with the European
Union conditions on human rights and minority protection policies.
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A comprehensive

monitoring report on Latvia’s preparations for membership that was published in 2003 stated that
Latvia had important shortcomings with regard to the full transposition of the acquis. 121 In this
context, Latvia was strongly encouraged to promote integration of the Russian minority by, in
particular, continuing to accelerate the speed of naturalization procedures, and by taking other
measures to increase the rate of naturalization. It was also expected to ensure sufficient flexibility
regarding transition to bilingual education in minority schools, and to ensure that at all levels the
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implementation of the language law respects the principle of justified public interest and
proportionality, as well as Latvia’s international obligations.122
3.5.2. Significant Institutions
The Presidents
The presidents are one of the major actors that have influence on the political setting. The
analysis of the performance of the presidents in regards to minority issues points to the effective
involvement that leads to changes. The major impact of the President could be supporting or
rejecting legislation in minority rights issues. According to Article 71 of the Latvian Constitution,
the Latvian President can return legislation to the Saeima for further deliberation.123 For the time
frame that is analyzed in this chapter, Latvia had two presidents namely Guntis Ulmanis (served
between 1993 and 1999) and Vaira Vike-Freiberga (served between 1999 and 2007).
The first President of the analysis, Guntis Ulmanis, used to be a member of the Latvian
Farmers’ Union party. As the time frame analyzed for Latvia here starts with 1998, the most of the
time that Guntis Ulmanis served as President is not included in this case study. However, as
mentioned in the previous part, Ulmanis held the Presidency during the parliamentary debate
within the People’s Party, Latvia’s Way, and the FF/LNNK coalition about the amendment of the
Latvian Citizenship Law.
Thus, the President Guntis Ulmanis’s first interference with the minority related policies is
his decision to return the citizenship law. As mentioned before, Latvia’s citizenship law adopted a
‘window system’ limiting the number who could apply each year and were designed give
citizenship primarily to those who had held it prior to the Soviet occupation in 1940 as well as
122
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their descendants. This law, however, left approximately one third of the country’s population
stateless unless they could demonstrate sufficient command of Latvian language, show familiarity
with the constitution, prove residence for 16+ years in the country, and take an oath of
allegiance.124
These strict laws could be seen as a reaction to the injustices of the Soviet past that
privileged Russians. However, becoming a part of the Europe politically required policy changes in
many areas including minority protection issues. Organizations such as Council of Europe and
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) demanded significant changes in
the human rights issues in Latvia as a prerequisite for membership before Latvia’s candidacy to the
European Union. As a matter of fact, Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis then returned the law to
parliament for reconsideration, a move that enabled Latvia to join the Council of Europe in 1995,
and signaled Latvia’s change in the direction of harmonizing with EU norms. 125
Another act of significant influence from the President as a significant institution is the
amendments made about the naturalization process. After submitting its EU membership
application in 1995, Latvia was excluded from accession talks at the end of 1997, given the slow
progress of naturalization.126 The two main reason of this problems were Fatherland and Freedom
party (FF) and the Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK) that were in coalition. These
two right wing and ethnic Latvian parties were against the idea of speeding up this process. It was
only after a long debate that the Latvian Saeima (Parliament) succeeded in its third attempt to
adopt the amendments. Urged along by President Guntis Ulmanis, MPs from the ruling Latvian
Way party, along with a few others, prevailed over the opposing FF/LNNK. 127
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Another significant impact of the President can be seen about the problematic language
law. The president Vaira Vike-Freiberga, who came to office in 1999 and served until 2007,
encountered external pressures from the European institutions about the strict nature of the
language law in Latvia. Therefore, the newly-elected President returned the language law to
parliament for reconsideration. She criticized the law for going against Latvia’s constitution and
international commitments as well as for lacking legal precision. More specifically, she urged that
the law: (1) should restore Latvian as the country’s dominant language but should lead integration
of non-Latvians by allowing them to use their own languages; and (2) abolish the parts restricting
the education and freedom of expression of non-Latvians, and to allow state interference in the
private sphere only when going against the public interest. 128 Taking Vike-Freiberga’s criticisms
into account, the Parliament approved a revised law on 9 December 1999. 129
Constitutional Court
The second institution analyzed is the Constitutional Court of Latvia. Latvijas Republikas

Satversmes Tiesa (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia) is an independent court, which
was established in 1996 on basis of the Constitution of Latvia made in 1994. The Constitutional
Court consists of 7 judges, 3 of which are nominated by Saeima members, 2 by Cabinet ministers,
and 2 by Supreme Court. All of the judges are confirmed by Saeima with majority vote, which
gives the Constitutional Court an ideological stand. The presidents and vice presidents of the
Constitutional Court serve in their positions for 3 years. The Constitutional Court of Latvia
intervened to the Europeanization process in minority policies to some degree.
The Mentzen or Mencena judgment of the Latvian Constitutional Court of 21 December
2001 has been one of the most relevant domestic court cases in Latvia. The surname of Mentzen, a
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Latvian citizen who acquired it through marriage to a German national, was “Latvianized” to
“Mencena” in her Latvian IDs. Thus, Mentzen asked the Constitutional Court to declare the
legislation as unconstitutional. Names and surnames in Latvian-issued documents are formed in
Latvianized form, according to Section 19 of the language law.

130

Juta Mencena submitted a

claim to the Constitutional Court because, after marrying a citizen of the German Federal
Republic, Ferdinand Carl Friedrich Mentzen, the Department of Citizenship and Migration Affairs
issued her a passport, spelling her surname Mencena. 131 The Constitutional Court declared the
legitimacy of article 19 of the state language law which states that “names of persons shall be
presented in accordance with the traditions of the Latvian language and written in accordance
with the existing norms of the literary language, observing the provisions of paragraph two of this
section.” 132 Paragraph two, together with Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 295 of 22
August 2000, belongs to the case invoked by Ms. Mentzen (or Mencena), stating that:
“There shall be set out in a passport or birth certificate, in addition to the
name and surname of the person presented in accordance with the existing
norms of the Latvian language, the historic family name of the person, or
the original form of the personal name in a different language,
transliterated in the Roman alphabet, if the person or the parents of a
minor person so wish and can verify such by documents.” 133
Another similar case is Kuhareca v. Latvia that was rejected by the Constitutional Court of
Latvia in 2001 and later by European Court of Human Rights in 2004. Again in this case, the
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Latvian Constitutional Court had found these provision of the language law constitutional. The
complaint of the applicant was an entry in her non-citizen’s passport. In the surname section, her
Russian surname was spelled as “Kuharec” although the original name was “Kuhareca”. However,
her complaints were rejected on the basis of Article 11 of Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers
No 49 on “Latvian Non-citizens’ Passport” which states that a surname in a passport should be
spelt according to the grammar and orthography of the Latvian language. 134
Both of the court cases are strong evidence of continuing practice of “Latvianization” of
personal names and surnames remains in force, which affects ethnic Russians rights mostly.
Another interesting point is the appeal of these cases to European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
Despite the fact that, the European Commission warned Latvia for respecting minority languages,
the European Court of Human Rights has turned down the cases Mentzen vs. Latvia and Kuharec
vs. Latvia filed against Latvia over the spelling of surnames in passports. The court said in its ruling
it was not in the court's competence to decide upon Latvia's system for spelling the names of
persons in Latvian. 135 Furthermore, according to ECHR the use of Mencena and Kuhareca 's the
Latvian language version for the two surnames 's has not prevented their holders from exercising
all their political, economic and social rights, the court ruled. 136 The court also found that, while
transforming the surnames Mentzen and Kuharec to comply with Latvian grammar peculiarities,
the surnames changed only minimally.
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These two different attitudes from two different EU

bodies, explains both insistence of Latvia’s Constitutional Court not to support the process of
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Europeanization of minority protection policies and the accession of Latvia to the European Union
despite its lack of competence in human rights issues.
Relatedly, the original Law on Electronic Media of Latvia requires that films aired in any
channel to be in Latvian language or with Latvian subtitles. Besides, the TV broadcasts in
languages other than Latvian, except news, live events, language learning broadcasts and
retranslated content, must be subtitled in Latvian.138 The same concerns movie theatres,
according to Section 17 of State Language Law. However, on 6 June 2003, the Constitutional
Court in Latvia published a decision abolishing the rule providing that no more than 25% of
programming broadcast on electronic mass media may be in foreign languages. 139 This decision,
which cannot be appealed, has led to an amendment of the Law on Radio and Television. The
Court affirmed that “the restrictions as regards the use of foreign languages envisaged by the said
rule may not be considered as necessary and proportionate in a democratic society”.140 The Court
also stated that it would have been possible to achieve the aim of integration of society by other
means less restrictive of the individual rights of people. Obviously, the aim of the rule had been to
increase the influence of the Latvian language upon the cultural environment in Latvia and to
speed up the integration of the ethnic minorities not the way that European Union demands as in
the “acquis communitaire” but the way that Latvia prefers.
3.5.3. Mobilization of Minorities
Latvian citizenship policies prevented non-citizens from participating in the public and
political life of the state by alienating these individuals from direct access to political or other
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forms of participation. The only means of collective action against the state came in the form of
Russian cultural associations in the early years of independence. Therefore, the Russian nongovernmental organizations became the most important platforms for mobilization of the Russian
community in Latvia. However, these organizations failed to become platforms for successful
political mobilization.
Some of these cultural oriented Russian organizations are Latvian Society of the Russian
Culture, or the Latvian Association of Teachers of the Russian Language and Literature.
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Furthermore, there are non-governmental organizations for the human rights issues such as
Latvian Human Rights Committee, the Latvian Association of Independent Experts, the Union of
Citizens and Non-citizens.142 However, these organizations do not apparently back any
disadvantaged Russian in human rights violations in Latvia, but rather stay as symbolic. Thirdly,
there is a Russian non-governmental organization concerned specifically with the Russian
language in Latvia due to Constitutional restrictions. Latvian Association for Support of Schools
with Russian Language of Instruction (LASSRLI) is founded as a result of the increased role of the
Latvian language as the language of instruction at national minorities’ schools. 143 There are other
non-governmental organizations as well that support the social life of Russians in Latvia. This
group comprises organizations such as the Russian Community of Latvia (RCL), the Russian Society
of Latvia (RSL), and the Liepaja Russian Community. 144 Currently, there are 28 ethnic Russian
NGOs in Latvia. 145 Thus, the organizations are generally based on non-political platform. On the
other hand, the associations of these non-governmental organizations are providing a platform
for political participation as they are related to the few Russian political parties. The political
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agenda of the pro-Russian political party ‘For Human Rights in the United Latvia’ greatly
influences the associations such as the Russian Society of Latvia and Latvian Association of Russian
Societies 146
Despite this fact, it should be noted that both the titular majority in Latvia and the Russian
speaking minority demonstrate low levels of civic participation in state affairs. According to the
study of Ijabs (2006), only 60 percent of Latvians and 62 percent of the Russian speaking
community had membership in a “religious, professional, political or cultural organization” in
2004. 147 Despite this low level of participation, Russian cultural associations emerged in response
to the exclusion of this group from the Latvian state. The Russian Community of Latvia is one these
NGOs founded in an attempt to advocate on behalf of the Russian-speaking minority. Similarly,
the United Congress of the Russian Community of Latvia (OKROL) was a mobilization against the
proposed education reforms. 148
As the Russian community in Latvia constitutes almost 27.8 percent of Latvia’s population
whether they have received their citizenship or not, the number of NGOs may increase the chance
of the potential mobilization of Russians. However, due to the language law, the presence of the
Russian minority is restricted in Parliament, which means that the only option for the Russian
minority to influence the government is through demonstration in the streets as happened on the
day Latvia acceded to the EU.
The Minorities at Risk project shows that the Russian minority has mobilized around
collective issues such as citizenship, education and language although the level of mobilization is
low. The analysis of the election results of ‘For Human Rights in United Latvia’ reveals this low
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level of mobilization. Before the 7th Saeima elections (1998-2002), the People’s Harmony Party,
the Socialist Party of Latvia and the Movement for Social Justice and Equal Rights founded the
block of “For Human Rights in the United Latvia”. 149 The Russian Party also joined the block. “For
Human Rights in the United Latvia” won 16 seats (16 percent) in the 7th Saeima.150 In 2000 the
Movement for Social Justice and Equal Rights was renamed “Equal Rights” with leaders T. Zhdanok
and V. Buzajev. The Russian Party left the association in 2001 before the municipal elections. 151
In the 8th Saeima (2002-2006) “For Human Rights in the United Latvia” had 25 seats (25
percent). 152 Notwithstanding the good results in the parliamentary elections, “For Human Rights
in the United Latvia” remained in opposition, same as in the previous Saeima. In 2003 the People’s
Harmony Party and the Socialist Party of Latvia left the association. Some parliament members
who had belonged to “For Human Rights in the United Latvia” joined the People’s Harmony Party.
As a result, there were only six members of “For Human Rights in the United Latvia” left as
members of the parliament/deputies.
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The analysis of these parliamentary elections reveals

types of behavior of the Russian electorate in Latvia.
3.6. Post-Accession Developments in Latvia on Minority Issues
The analysis of pre-accession period of Latvia revealed that Latvia acceded to the
European Union in 2004 despite the fact that it failed to fully comply with “acquis communitaire”,
specifically on human rights and minority protection issues.
Similar to the pre-accession period, the post-accession period in Latvia is politically
unstable, which prevented governments from paying attention to the minority protection issues.
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After accession to the European Union, the government collapsed and a new coalition
government, led by Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis, took office in 2004, which was re-elected on in
2006. Both general elections secured the victory for the ruling center-right coalition led by the
People's Party. Coalition parties included the Centre Party; the Latvian Peasants Union and the
Green Party. Consistent with my hypothesis on the ‘position of governments’, the center-right
coalition further toughened up the legislation on citizenship in 2006. Candidates who fail a
Latvian language test three times will be denied citizenship. People without citizenship are
entitled neither to vote nor to obtain an EU passport. 154
The economic stability with the help of recession shadowed the policies of Kalvitis
government, and thus the priorities of both the government and the public remained as the
economy. Thus, Latvia's economy grew by 50 percent between 2004 and 2007 but the global
financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 hit the country hard, and Latvia endured one of the worst
recessions in the EU. 155 Although Kalvitis was forced to step down in December 2007, the fourparty center-right coalition government continued in office, headed by Prime Minister Ivars
Godmanis. However, the global financial crisis which caused a severe contraction of Latvia's
economy brought about the government's collapse and the fall of the Godmanis government in
February 2009. 156
Meanwhile, a pro-Russian party Harmony Center secured win in Riga municipal elections
and Nils Ušakovs became the first Russian to be Major of Riga which is a significant success of
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Russians in politics, although not at national level.

157

Following the collapse of two center-right

coalitions and political stability, Latvia’s Parliament, Saeima continued to be headed by another
center-right coalition government which composed of New Era, the People's Party, the Union of
Greens and Farmers, For Fatherland and Freedom. Valdis Dombrovskis, a former Finance Minister
and a Member of the European Parliament for New Era since 2004 was the Prime Minister of this
coalition. The People's Party left the coalition government in March 2010, but Prime Minister
Dombrovskis continued in office and formed a majority coalition government composed of a new
Unity coalition in 2010. 158 However, in 2011, then-President Valdis Zatlers used his constitutional
power to dissolve Parliament, which ended up with a new coalition government of Unity, Reform
Party and the right-wing National Alliance headed again by Dombrovskis. 159
Analyzing the post-accession political parties in Latvia, it was not until 2011 that a minority
party became strong. During the 2011 elections, pro-Russian Harmony Centre Party emerged as
the largest party, however, the coalition headed by Dombrovskis excluded it and the Russian
community failed to be represented in the Parliament in Latvia. The problems of the ethnic
Russians in Latvia and minority protection issues became more significant after a pro-Russia party,
Harmony Center, won the most seats in Parliament but was excluded from the governing
coalition by the ruling Unity Party, which instead cut a deal with a Latvian nationalist group. Seven
years after the accession to the European Union, Latvia continued discriminating Russians
politically.
Following 2011 elections, the most significant evidence of non-compliance of Latvia to the

“acquis” of the European Union was the referendum held in 2012. It was a constitutional
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referendum on the amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia to make changes in
Articles 4, 18, 21, 101 and 104 of the Constitution of Latvia to make Russian as the second official
language. However, the referendum was rejected by a large margin. Nearly 75 percent, or
821,722 people, opposed the referendum, while 25 percent, or 273,347 voters, were in favor of
Russian as a second language in Latvia.160
The reactions to the referendum show that post-accession period in Latvia is consistent
with the pre-accession developments, specifically if ‘position of governments” and ‘significant
institutions’ are taken into consideration. Following the referendum, the Latvian President Andris
Berzins stated that voting on a second state language endangered one of the most sacred
foundations of the Latvian Constitution, which is the state language. 161 Unsurprisingly, the Prime
Minister Dombrovskis, who actively opposed the referendum and previously excluded pro-Russian
party in the coalition, was grateful to Latvian voters for resoundingly rejecting it. Furthermore,
according to Dombrovskis, the "Native Tongue" movement, which initiated the idea of
referendum, was playing a political game with a fundamental question.162
Unlike the other two variables, the findings of the analysis of ‘mobilization of minorities’ in
post-accession period Latvia contradicts with those in pre-accession period. The 2012 referendum
is the most significant development led by the mobilized ethnic Russians. The vote was initiated by
the "Native Tongue" movement, which collected enough signatures to prompt the vote by Russian
lobby groups aimed at mobilizing the Russian minority and force the government to open a
dialogue with the ‘national minorities’. The referendum failed, but its significance lies in the
polarization of Latvian politics on the minority protection issues, which revealed by the election
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result of 2011, when the centrist parties refused a coalition with the main pro-Russian party and
the election winner, Harmony Centre and instead went into a coalition government with a radical
right-wing party. 163
The exclusion of the pro-Russian Harmony Center started a mobilization that could not be
seen in the pre-accession period of Latvia. Thus, a top-down mobilization occurred for Russians a
with the former leader of the Latvian branch of the National Bolshevik Party Vladimir Linderman,
the leader of the radical-left Osipov's party Yevgeny Osipov, and the youth movement “United
Latvia”. This petition collected 187,378 signatures, more than the necessary 10% needed to
trigger a referendum. 164 Thus, this mobilization lead to the referendum in 2012. Although, it is not
possible to expect a referendum in Latvia, that asks Russian as a second language to succeed, the
result can be counted as a success, because it launched the most significant mobilization among
ethnic Russians since the independence of Latvia.
3.7. Conclusion: Europeanization of Minority policies in Latvia: Integration vs. Assimilation
On the day that Latvia acceded to the European Union, ethnic Russians preferred to
organize a protest against the government while the Latvians were celebrating it. Ethnic Russians
in Latvia held a huge rally in defense of their language rights as the ex-Soviet state Latvia formally
joined the EU with nine other states. The protests were due to the fact that with the education
law, at least 60% of classes must be taught in Latvian in public schools, including the ethnic
schools. The answer of the President to these protests was summarizing the process of the
Europeanization of minority protection policies in Latvia until accession. The President Vaira VikeFreiberga went on Latvian radio to defend the language and education law and stated that
“…laws, in every respect, from every side, have been examined and found to be compatible with
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human rights. Europe is not going to reject us, whether or not our schoolchildren protest in the
streets.” 165
The language and education have been considered as two important factors in the statebuilding in the independent Latvia. The Latvian educational system has, therefore, been described
as ‘the most important driving force of the integration process. The National Program of “The
Integration of Society in Latvia” was one of these efforts to integrate the ethnic Russians into the
society. The Russian-speaking community, on the other hand, has been concerned about the
increasing limit of the right of education in the minority language.
The results of this case study of Latvia reveal that the influence of the domestic factors on
the Europeanization of the minority protection policies. During the time frame between 1998 and
2004, the political sphere in Latvia allowed a low level of rule adoption. The unstable
governments and coalitions during this period and restrictions due to the language law prevented
a successful Europeanization of minority protection in Latvia. The European Commission reports
between 1998 and 2003 include warnings regarding minority issues that criticize governments.
However, the analysis of the governmental activities about minority issues during this time period
shows that the governments of Latvia have not significantly considered these reports for
development in minority issues. The unstable political environment in Latvia in the pre-accession
period supported short-term coalition, mostly lead by center-right political parties that either
ignore or oppose the Europeanization of minority protection policies. The post-accession analysis
of the governments is consistent with the pre-accession period, as the unstable political
environment was further consolidated with economic recession. Although 2011 elections brought
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success for the pro-Russian Harmony Center, it was excluded from the coalition led by right-wing
parties, which in turn ended up with Language Law referendum in 2012.
The analysis of the significant institutions of the case study also shows the influence of the
President and the Constitutional Court on the Europeanization of minority policies in Latvia.
Regarding the analysis of the related cases decided by the Constitutional Court, we see that the
legislation and practices were not disapproved. There are two significant cases about minority
issues decided by the Constitutional Court during the period between 1998 and 2004. The
decisions about the Mencena and Kuhareca cases, the Constitutional Court supports the
parliamentary activities about the minority related legislation.
On the other hand, the President’s activities contradicted the governments. During the
time period of my analysis, there are two presidents served for Latvia. To increase the slow
progress of naturalization the President Guntis Ulmanis supported the MPs from the ruling Latvian
Way party along with a few others against the opposing nationalist FF/LNNK coalition. Similarly,
the president Vaira Vike-Freiberga who came to office in 1999 returned the language law to
parliament for reconsideration as she encountered external pressures from the European
Commission. The post-accession analysis of the ‘significant institutions’ contradicts with the preaccession period in Latvia. Thus, the reaction of the Latvian President Andris Berzins to the
referendum on language law in 2012 was supportive of the government against it.
As the final independent variable, ‘the mobilization of minorities’ can be considered to
have influenced the Europeanization process in Latvia. The analysis of minority activities during
the time period between 1998 and 2004 suggests that a successful mobilization is required for
Europeanization process. However, because of the lack of participation from the ethnic Russian
community, the level of mobilization is low and not significantly effective either through social or
political mobilization. On the other hand, in the post-accession period a top-down mobilization
71

launched by the Russian leaders on the minority protection. The success of the pro-Russian
Harmony Center in the 2011 elections and the movement led to 2012 referendum are two most
important examples of mobilization, although could not succeed in bringing the demanded
changes.
These evolutions are important in the light of the European Commission
recommendations. According to the 2003 monitoring report on Latvia’s preparations for EU
membership, Latvia is expected to ensure ‘sufficient flexibility’ regarding transition to bilingual
education in minority schools.166 This rather general and unclear provision signifies the European
Commission’s reluctance to actively engage in discussions about the Russian minorities in Latvia.
The result of this policy brought the accession of Latvia in the European Union in 2004 despite the
criticism about the minority-related issues. These obvious ongoing problems provoke allegations
that the EU is using ‘double standards’ in the field of minority policies which will be analyzed by
the comparison of the same process in the other cases in this dissertation, namely Bulgaria and
Turkey.
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CHAPTER 4
BULGARIA: TURKS AND ROMA
Bulgaria is a parliamentary democracy with a legal system based on civil law. Due to
suppression of ethnic minorities Bulgaria has long suffered from problems as a post-Soviet state.
The process starting with Bulgaria’s candidacy to the European Union pointed to the need for
revisions in the Bulgaria’s policies in minority protection and human rights. Regarding the
situation of the ethnic minorities and the process of the Europeanization in the human rights and
minority protection issues in Bulgaria, this chapter analyzes the situation of two largest ethnic
minority groups in Bulgaria: Roma and Turks.
According to the demographic sources the majority group constitutes about 84 percent of
the total population in the country. The largest minorities are the Turks, who constitute about 9.4
percent of the total population. The Turkish population is concentrated in three of the nine
administrative regions of Bulgaria. The second largest ethnic minority group is the Roma
population who constitute about 4.6 percent of the population, according to official statistics. 167
The Roma population lives in different parts of the country across Bulgaria. The Russian, Armenian,
Macedonians, Greeks, Ukrainians, Jews, and Romanians constitute less than one percent of the
total population in Bulgaria.168 (See Table 4.1)
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Table 4.1. Total Population and the Percentage of Ethnic Minorities in Bulgaria169
Percentage
Population

Minorities

of
in

Ethnic
overall

Population
Turk 9.4 %
Roma 4.6 %
BULGARIA

7.6 million

Others (Russian, Armenian,
Macedonians, Greeks,
Ukrainians, Jews, and
Romanians)2 %

4.1. Roma and Turkish Population during the Ottoman Era
The presence of the Turks and Roma in Bulgaria dates back to 14th century when the
Ottoman Empire was the major power in the region. In pursuit of the Ottoman state policy, many
Muslims from Eastern Anatolia were settled in the Balkans. Within a short time they gained a
dominant position in the region. Around the end of the 14th century, the first large groups of
ethnic Turks began to settle in Bulgaria (Troebst 1994) as well as Roma people (Kenrick 1993).
As the Roma accompanied the Ottoman army, the numbers of Roma in the Bulgarian lands
increased with the Ottoman invasion in the Balkans in 14th and15th century. The status of the
Roma during the Ottoman period was very particular because they could not fit in either the
Muslim or the non-Muslim groups. 170 As the Roma were both Muslim and Christian, they lived as
a separate, ethnically determined group, while the rest of the population lived in religiously
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determined ones.171 Their situation within the Ottoman Empire was thus better than elsewhere in
Europe, although they were still at the bottom of the society. 172
4.2 Independence of Bulgaria and the Results for the Turks and Roma
The independence of Bulgaria and the founding of the modern Bulgarian state in 1878
brought major changes into the lives of the ethnic minorities. Initially, the demography changed
in favor of the Bulgarians while around one million Turks were uprooted from their homes and
some 350,000 were killed or died of hunger and epidemics.173 As a result of the disintegration of a
multi-national Ottoman Empire and the drawing of new state borders, the Turkish minority in
Bulgaria, that until then dominant in political life became isolated and weaker than the other
groups in the newly founded state. 174
The intensification of the Bulgarian identity in the 19th century not only strengthened the
national spirit of the Bulgarians but also affected the situation of Roma population as well as the
Turks. The independence of Bulgaria increased the prejudices against the Roma, especially against
Muslim Roma, because the ethnic Bulgarians were mostly Christians.175 The end of the Ottoman
Empire and the establishment of the Bulgarian state posed new problems to the Roma, despite
both the Berlin Treaty of 1878 and the Constitution of Bulgaria that contained clauses regarding
the protection of ethnic and religious minorities. 176
Under this circumstance, both the Turks and Roma followed different ways to integrate
into the Bulgarian society. With the foundation of new Bulgaria, the Roma’s desire to fit into the
171
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mainstream society strengthened. They began to give up their own identity in exchange for a
place in the social structure.177 The first Roma organization in Bulgaria was founded in 1901 with
the aim to lead the Roma in their struggle for integration into Bulgarian society. Roma-organized
activities intensified during the first decade of the 20th century in response to a discriminatory
election law passed by the Bulgarian Parliament.178
Despite the integration efforts of Roma, during and after the Balkan wars and the First
World War, Turkish emigration increased.179 According to a Bulgarian estimate, approximately
350,000 left between 1880 and 1911. Between the World Wars, some 150,000-200,000 Turks
emigrated, mainly on the basis of the Turkish-Bulgarian agreement of 1925.180 The period 19361937 saw the signing of an agreement between the two governments for the long-term limited
emigration of 10,000 Turks annually. 181 According to Eminov (1997), the Bulgarian governments
in the period between the foundation of Bulgaria and the Second World War (1878-1944) tried to
honor the provisions of international and bilateral agreements guaranteeing the rights of
minorities. 182 Thus, there was no open legal discrimination or political oppression of the Turkish
and Muslim communities. However, the practice of these rights within the country was different
than the legal provisions. Thus, the Turks enjoyed better situation compared to the Roma.183 The
economic troubles during and after the Balkan Wars and the First World War affected the Roma
more than the Bulgarian population on average.184 However, after the end of the First World War
and the establishment of the Peasants’ Party (BANU), government allowed Roma to demand the
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restoration of their rights and, more importantly, to benefit from the social reforms of the
government. 185
The launch of Communist party era in Bulgaria brought changes to the situation of ethnic
minorities after the Second World War. The pressure was heavily on religion, but at the same time
education and modernization was encouraged. Basically, all religious communities in the country
were exposed to the same amount of atheist pressure from the secular government. 186 Thus,
Dimitrov government undermined the religious practices of both Muslims and Christians in
Bulgaria, which resulted in the sudden emigration of 155,000 Turks to Turkey in 1950. 187Similarly,
in the early 1950s all local Roma organizations and cultural institutions were dissolved, and the
most strong Roma representative in the National Assembly was sent to a concentration camp. 188
Around 5,000 Muslim Roma were forced to immigrate to Turkey in 1950-51.189
These policies towards minorities were followed by more nationalist attitudes in Bulgaria
in 1960s. The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) held a campaign to undermine not only religious
affiliation, but also the separate ethnic identity of these minority groups for a homogenous
Bulgaria with a single ethnic type. As of 1971, a new Constitution was adopted which referred
minorities as ‘citizens of non-Bulgarian extraction’. 190
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Table 4.2. Timeline of Important Political Events in Bulgaria
Year

Political Event
The Declaration of Independence from

1878

Ottoman Empire
World War I. Bulgaria allied itself with

1914-1918

Germany.
World War II - Soviet army invaded German-

1939-1945

occupied Bulgaria in 1944. Soviet-backed
political party Fatherland Front took power
Monarchy abolished and republic declared.

1946

Communist Party won election.
One party system, new constitution declared

1947

along Soviet lines, economy nationalized.

1971

Zhivkov became the President.
Revival process began. Zhivkov government
forced Turkish minority to assimilate and take

1984

Slavic names. Many resisted and around
300,000 Turks left the country.
Communist Zhivkov Regime Collapsed, multi-

1989

party system introduced.
Communist Party appeared as Bulgarian

1990

Socialist Party (BSP) and won parliamentary
elections.
New constitution declared Bulgaria a

1991

parliamentary republic and provided broad
range of freedoms.
Zhelev became Bulgaria's first directly-elected

1992

president.
Official Candidacy of Bulgaria for the EU

1997

membership declared.
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2004

Bulgaria became part of NATO

2007

Bulgaria became part of European Union
General elections won by the center-right
Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria
(GERB) party led by Boiko Borisov. 26 Turks and

2009

one Roma succeeded in taking seats in
Parliament. A Turkish minister started serving in
the cabinet.
France and Germany blocked Bulgaria from
joining Schengen passport-free zone, due to its

2010

failure to fight against corruption and
organized crime
Rosen Plevneliev, from the center-right Citizens
for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB)

2011

party of Prime Minister Borisov, beat the
Socialist candidate in the presidential election.
Anti-Roma demonstrations launched in Sofia

2012

following the death of a youth by a Roman.
National Roma Integration Strategy of the

2012

Republic of Bulgaria 2012-2020 was adopted
by the National Assembly.

4.3. Zhivkov Government and the Revival Process (1984-89)
The Revival Process (a.k.a process of rebirth) marked an assimilation period for the ethnic
Turks in Bulgaria as part of Zhivkov government. The Bulgarian government started excluding the
term “Turk” from official discourse, and replacing it with “Muslim Bulgarian citizens” implying that
the “Turks” were “Bulgarians” in origin.
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size of the Turkish community in the late 1960s and 1970s as an influential ethnic group. 192 Also,
the government claimed that the Turkish minority were not related to the Turks in the
motherland. 193
As part of the Revival Process, the Communist Party launched a direct attack on the
identity of the Turkish population. It forcefully changed their names to Bulgarian ones, and
banned public use of the Turkish language and Muslim religious rituals.

194

Thus, the

reconstruction of the Bulgarian names would weaken the Turkish influence in society and lead to a
peaceful Bulgaria without contradiction.195 This process affected mostly the Bulgarian Turkish
minority, but also had an effect on the Roma population, who had Muslim names and spoke
Turkish. 196
According to the reports of Amnesty International, the name-changing campaign in
Bulgaria received attention from the international community as well, especially from Turkey. In
July, 1989 the Senate of the 101st Congress of the USA voted unanimously on an amendment that
expressed “the sense of the Congress condemning Bulgaria’s brutal treatment of its Turkish
minority”, and it allocated about $10 million as assistance to the Republic of Turkey, in order for
the latter to cope with the huge influx of refugees.
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community interest on the issue, Zhivkov addressed the Bulgarian public on national television
and appealed to Turkey to open up its borders to every Bulgarian Muslim willing to immigrate,
which resulted in half of the work force in Bulgarian agriculture being lost due to the “Big
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Excursion” in 1989. 198 In a few months almost 340 thousand people left for Turkey. However,
after the collapse of the Communist Party and Zhivkoc regime in 1989, 42 per cent of the total
number of emigrants returned to Bulgaria. 199
4.4. The Collapse of Zhivkov Regime and the Restoration of the Ethnic Identities
With the downfall of the Zhivkov regime these policies were officially ended in 1989. With
the return of a part of the Bulgarian Turks from Turkey, the government allowed restoration of the
Turkish and Arabic names through the Names of Bulgarian Citizens Act in March 1990. During this
process, more than 600,000 Turks, Bulgarian Muslims and Roma people applied for reappropriation of their old ‘Islamic-Arabic’ names.200 However, despite this positive developments
after the fall of communism, ethnic Turks in Bulgaria still faced some problems that resulted from
the neglect of their minority status in the country. The segregation of and discrimination against
the Roma minority as well was still a problem.
Although the post-Communist party era in Bulgaria gave the names and identities back to
the ethnic minorities, the growing gap in wellbeing between the minorities and mainstream
society in Bulgaria increased. The poverty was dramatically concentrated among certain
population groups. Ethnic minorities comprised over 60 per cent of the poor population in the
country, with Roma being ten times more likely to be poor and Turks four times more likely to be
poor than ethnic Bulgarians.201 Although end of 20th century brought the identities back, it also
put the ethnic minorities in a disadvantaged status in cycle of poverty in addition to the social and
economic discrimination, restricted education, and poor access to health care.202
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The wave of European Union accession in the Central and Eastern European countries
marked a new era for the ethnic minorities in Bulgaria. With the EU candidacy of Bulgaria as of
1998, the European Union institutions and the community became interested in the minority
protection policies in the country. In the next part, I will discuss the demands of the European
Union about ethnic minorities in Bulgaria as part of the EU membership requirements.
Table 4.3. Historical Demographic Change of Turks and Roma in Bulgaria203
Census Year
1878
(independence of
Bulgaria from
Ottoman Empire)
1920
(after WWI)
1946
(after WWII)
1992
(after Zhivkov regime
and revival process)
2001
(first census after the
EU candidacy)
2011

Total Population of
Bulgaria

Number of Turks

Number of Roma

3,154,375

607,331 (19.3%)

(No Data Available)

4,846,971

520,339 (10.7%)

98.451 (2%)

7,029,349

675,500 (9.6%)

170, 000 (2.4 %)

8,487,317

800,052 (9.4%)

313, 396 (4 %)

7,928,901

746,664 (9.4%)

370, 908 (4.7 %)

7,364,570

588,318 (9.4%

325, 343 (4.6 %)

4.5. The European Union’s Pre-Accession Conditionality and Demands
The European Commission’s Opinion on the EU Membership of Bulgaria reported the
missing policies in the field of human rights and minority protection in the country regarding the

acquis communitaire for EU membership. Bulgaria was criticized for not being a signatory of the
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Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on Minorities and the Recommendation 1201 of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which provides for the collective rights of
minorities although it was not legally binding. 204
In terms of the minority protection policies, the European Commission pointed to the
situation of two ethnic minority groups in Bulgaria: Turks and the Roma population. The situation
of the Turkish minority, which had suffered considerable discrimination before 1989 under the
Communist regime, improved after the collapse of the Zhivkov government. The Turkish
minorities gained representation in the parliament in 1990s. As of 1997, 15 members of the
Turkish minority were representing their community in Parliament. 205 In terms of linguistic rights,
the Turkish minority had the right to receive education in their own language. However,
restriction of the ethnic languages to be used for official communications in areas specifically
where minorities represent a significant percentage of the population was reported to be a
problem in Bulgaria.
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In addition to these problems, poverty and economic inequalities are

documented to be the major problems facing the ethnic minorities in Bulgaria.
Although, Turks were seen to be more integrated, the Roma population was reported to
suffer considerable discrimination in daily life, including violence either directly by the police or
by individuals whom the police did not always prosecute. 207 Their social position was difficult,
though here sociological factors played a part alongside the discrimination they suffered from the
rest of the population.
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consistently analyzed the minority protection policies and respect for human rights issues under
two topics; social integration and economic situation.
4.5.1. Social Integration of the Ethnic Minorities
According to the European Commission reports on the human rights issues in Bulgaria
published between 1998 and 2007, the ethnic minorities in Bulgaria faced discrimination in all
spheres of social life including political representation, education health and housing issues. The
current Bulgarian Constitution forbids the establishment of parties on ethnic and religious basis.
The article 11 of the Constitution states that “political parties may not be founded on ethnic,
racial or religious basis”. 209 Enforcement of this provision led to the disqualification of several
minority parties from participation in the electoral process. Nevertheless, the Roma population
had a few representatives in the Bulgarian Parliament under the main stream parties. However, as
these representatives were elected as candidates of the mainstream parties, they failed to bring
the problems about Roma population to the parliament because of the fear of losing their
position. Although the non-governmental organizations have been the most active parties in the
struggle for improvement of the Roma’s situation in Bulgaria, they did not succeed in bringing
attention to the situation of Roma. Turks followed a different way in political participation. The
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), although it is predominantly Turkish, has never
admitted this openly in official documents or in its public activity. 210
As the crimes conducted by the Roma were often presented in the media widely, the
image of the Roma as the only criminals was deep-rooted in the Bulgarian society. Thus, the bad
image of the Roma has been prominent despite the various attempts from the Bulgarian Roma
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organizations to end the ethnically related stereotyping. 211 The negative portrayal of Roma by the
society has largely contributed to the prejudiced attitude of both the society and the authorities
towards the Roma.212 The high crime rate among the Roma population and the media-promoted
image of Roma as criminals have increased the rate of the abuse of Roma by the police in Bulgaria,
which was one of the factors attracted attention from the European Commission. 213
According to the reports by the European Roma Rights Centre, Roma have been subject to
severe beatings and the use of threats by the police and were detained on remand far more often
than non-Roma citizens, being kept there for inordinately long periods.

214

ERRC claim that

Bulgarian courts followed a xenophobic attitude toward the minorities. Minor crimes carried out
by the Roma are punished more severely than the more serious crimes carried out by nonRoma.215
Despite the discriminative attitudes toward Roma, the linguistic rights have not been seen
as a big problem. According to Tomova (1995), in Bulgaria, 90 per cent of the Roma population
speaks Romani, which is the highest percentage among the European countries, but only roughly
50 per cent of them speak Romani at home on a regular basis. 216 With the collapse of the Zhivkov
government, Roma have been free to use Romani at home and in minority communication.
However, ECCR reports showed that an interesting regulation regarding language was the
prohibition of the use of any language other than Bulgarian during visitation hours in prisons, and
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also allowing the use of a translator at the expense of the imprisoned. 217 According to Tomova
(1995), because of their ease in accepting the surrounding language traditionally and the
assimilation policies in the past, most Roma speak Bulgarian, Turkish or Vlach, because these
mainstream languages are considered to be more “prestigious” and claimed to be the “mother
tongue” by Roma in various surveys.218 Similarly, the ethnic Turkish minority had been free to
express itself in its mother tongue in private and in public before Bulgaria’s EU candidacy.
Furthermore, ethnic Turks were not allowed to display traditional local names, street names and
other topographical indications in their mother tongue, in contradiction to the Council of
Europe’s Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. 219
Getting education in their language was not possible for Roma before the collapse of the
Communist regime in Bulgaria, despite the fact that Romani is defined as a “mother tongue” by
the Constitution, and thus could be studied up to four hours per week as an elective course in
schools. 220 Before EU candidacy of Bulgaria, the governments agreed that the lack of qualified
teachers to teach in the Roma language, and the lack of desire on behalf of the Roma to have their
children study Romani, have prevented the spread of the initiative for ethnic education.
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Although the restrictions on the Turkish language were also lifted after the collapse of the
Communist regime, the teaching of minority languages at school was not implemented evenly.
Although, Turkish minority activists expressed their desire to improve mother tongue teaching by
including it in the regular school curriculum and also by teaching some subjects in Turkish, the
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Minister of Education, Ilcho Dimitrov, clearly stated that Turkish schools would not be allowed to
exist in Bulgaria and that Turks were free to go to Turkey if they wanted so. 222
The issue of minority broadcast media is also related to the linguistic rights in Bulgaria. The
post-1989 legislation allows for a relatively broad freedom of the press in Bulgaria. The Turkishdominated Turkish Movement of Rights and Freedoms (MRF), founded in 1990, asked for
broadcasting in ethnic languages. The Bulgarian National Radio started some programs in Turkish
in 1993, but this practice was terminated in 1994. Programming in Romani has not been
considered. 223 The 1996 Law on Radio and Television put an end to any hopes for broadcasts in
minority languages as it included a requirement that country wide broadcasts can only be
transmitted in Bulgarian.
4.5.2. Economic Challenges for the Ethnic Minorities
The discrimination towards the Roma population in society, which is mostly shaped with
the prejudice due to high crime rate among the Roma population depends on poverty and poor
economic conditions especially.224 Job discrimination is part of the reason behind the Roma’s
poverty, and is consistently referred in European Commission Annual Progress Reports on Bulgaria
between 1998 and 2007. The Roma’s economic situation, which has never been good,
deteriorated sharply after 1989 as a consequence of the general economic crisis in Bulgaria. The
unemployment rate of Roma population increased to a level much higher than the country’s
average.225 Besides being less educated and less skilled, Roma suffered from the prejudices
discussed in the Bulgarian society.
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Similar to the Roma population, the economic strains were the major problems that the
Turkish ethnic minorities were facing according to European Commission documents. Most of the
ethnic Turks live in the countryside in Bulgaria and have less access to work opportunities,
educational, cultural and health-care facilities. According to Minority Rights Group International
report in 1991, towards the end of Communist regime the Turkish minorities in Bulgaria
constituted from 15 to 20 per cent of the work force in the tobacco growing areas in the south
and the wheat growing areas in the northeast. 226 It was these branches of agriculture that suffered
most from the massive immigration of Turks to Turkey in 1989. Also, there have been conflicts
between Turkish tobacco producers and the state monopoly for tobacco (Bulgartabak) over the
low price paid to the producers, which was intervened by the pro-Turkish party, the Movement for
Rights and Freedoms (MRF) for higher prices.
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The law on privatization of farmland passed in

1992 also had negative effects on the Bulgarian Turks. As a result from this hard economic
situation, a new wave of emigration started in the summer of 1992 that was perceived as a threat
by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (the party of the Bulgarian Turks) for losing a large part
of its electorate through immigration. 228 According to Hoepken, economic emigrants reached
50,000 in 1991-1992.229
4.6. Analysis: Bulgaria’s Compliance with the ‘ Acquis Communitaire’ on Minority
Protection
This case study covers Bulgaria’s Europeanization process since Bulgaria became an official
candidate state for European Union membership in 1998 until its accession to the European Union
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in 2007. I look at the influence of the ‘position of the government’, ‘significant institutions’ and
‘mobilization of minorities’ on the Europeanization of minority protection policies in Bulgaria.
4.6.1. The position of the government
The collapse of the Communist regime in Bulgaria in 1989 was the beginning of the
democratization process. Thus, EU candidacy further consolidated the process. In 1997 the
government established a consultative body on minority issues, called the National Council on
Ethnic and Demographic Questions and many minority groups have been represented on the
Council. In the same year, Bulgaria ratified the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities. 230
Controversially, the 1991 constitution stated that ‘political parties may not be founded on
ethnic, racial or religious bases'. 231 Although the enforcement of this provision is a violation of
international conventions, it succeeded in disqualifying several ethnic minority parties from
participation in the electoral process, including initially the Turkish Movement for Rights and
Freedoms (MRF). However, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms was able to claim that it was a
‘movement' and not a party to gain legal recognition. However, Roma representatives could not
go beyond being part of main parties in Bulgaria and kept their identities for themselves.
Although the European Commission reports of 1997 and 1998 brought attention to the problem
of political representation for ethnic minorities, this was ignored by the Bulgarian governments at
that time. A Macedonian party founded in 1999 was banned in 2000. Apart from 28 Turks, the
240-seat Bulgarian National Assembly had only three other minorities in 2005, only one of whom
was Roma. 232 (See Table 4.5 For political parties and ideologies in Bulgaria)
230
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Table 4.5. Major Political Parties and Their Ideologies in Bulgaria 233
Name

Abbreviation

Ideology

BCP

Communism

Bulgarian Socialist Party

BSP

Left-wing, Social Democrat

Citizens for European

GERB

Center-right

National Union Attack

ATAKA

Far-right, nationalist party

Movement for Rights and

MRF

Pro-Turkish Minority Party

BZNS

Left-wing, Center-right

Bulgarian Communist Party

Development of Bulgaria

Freedoms
Bulgarian Agrarian People’s
Union

The governments serving after the collapse of the Zhivkov government were considerably
more reluctant even to recognize the discussion on ethnic parties despite significant external
impetus to address the issue. In 2006, the International Helsinki Federation concluded that the
governments of Bulgaria consistently denied the demand from the ethnic minorities for political
representation and that all the Bulgarian political parties in the parliament backed this policy. 234
Following EU candidacy of Bulgaria, there have been some efforts to a better Roma policy
by Bulgarian governments. In early 1997, for example, the Council of Ministers adopted a Program
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for Resolution of the Problems of Roma in the Republic of Bulgaria, preceded by a report on the
situation of Roma in Bulgaria.

235

In 1998, the government established a National Council on

Ethnic and Demographic Issues, part of whose job was to draft a program, in coordination with
Roma leaders, for the improvement of the opportunities available to Bulgarian Roma. 236
Later in 1999, the government came to an agreement with Roma representatives on a
Framework Program for Equal Integration of Roma.

237

The Roma NGOs in particular took

advantage of an anti-discrimination law passed in 2003, which allows civil society organizations to
file public-interest lawsuits. 238 Right before Bulgaria's accession to the European Union in 2007
the government adopted a number of measures aimed at improving minority rights, especially for
Roma. Whilst Roma in particular remain under-represented at the national level, their
representation at municipal level has increased markedly in recent years. 239
In addition to political representation, the European Commission reports published
between 1997 and 2007 have indicated that the linguistic rights have been reported to be
problematic in Bulgaria. Although Bulgaria allows education in minority languages, inadequate
government resources have restricted its availability. Turkish, Armenian, Hebrew, Greek and
Roma are offered as elective courses at the primary and secondary level education. Also, public
broadcasting is to be available in languages other than Bulgarian by law, but in practice, such
public television and radio programming is only available to a limited extent in Turkish. Romani
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language teaching has not been available; however, in 2003 two universities introduced training
programs for Romani-language teachers. In 2006 the government adopted regulations aimed at
reducing segregation of Roma in schools. 240
Furthermore, in 2000, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) claimed that the
Bulgarian Government had violated European human rights standards in the case of Velikova v.
Bulgaria. The case concerns the death in police custody of a 49-year-old Romani man named
Slavcho Tsonchev in September, 1994. 241 In its ruling, the European Court held unanimously that
Bulgaria had committed violations of Article 2 (right to life) and Article 13 (right to an effective
remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC),
an international public interest law organization which monitors the situation of Roma in Europe
and provides legal defense in instances of human rights abuse, provided the applicant, Anya
Velikova, with legal counsel throughout the proceedings before the European Court of Human
Rights. 242 In another case in 2004, the ECHR ruled that by its failure to investigate violence and
killings of Roma by Bulgarian police, Bulgaria had violated the right to life and the prohibition on
discrimination given in Convention Articles 2 and 14. 243
4.6.2. Significant Institutions
The Presidents
The Presidents are the chief of the state in Bulgaria, who is elected by popular vote for a
five-year term and eligible for a second term. With the EU candidacy, Bulgaria has started to seek
240
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more friendly relations between the state and the ethnic minorities, specifically with Turks. In
1997 the newly elected president, Peter Stoyanov, delivered a speech to the Turkish National
Assembly asking for forgiveness for what had been done to the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. 244 A
question concerning the delimitation of part of the border between Bulgaria and Turkey and the
territorial waters in the Black Sea was resolved after forty years of negotiations, through an
agreement signed in December 1997.245
Despite this attempt of better relations, political representation rights for the ethnic
groups, which are banned by the Constitution, have been a continuing problem in Bulgaria.
Ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities signed by the
Bulgarian President in 1997 and ratified by the Parliament in 1999, caused a major controversy in
Bulgarian politics due to the use of the word ‘minorities’. According to the Bulgarian Socialist
Party, the “Bulgarian realities, historical and contemporary, alike, provide unambiguous testimony
to the fact that despite the differences in the ethnicity, culture, language and religion on the
Bulgarian territory, no national minorities have been shaped out”.
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The former authoritarian

Soviet background of Bulgaria and accordingly the lack of civil society did not allow the
‘minorities’ to define themselves in Bulgaria and get the required respect and recognition either in
the Constitution or in the society. 247
Thus, the President’s positive attitude, supported with the legal framework could not
succeed in drawing the lines for the term ‘minority’. This is mostly because of the ambiguity in the
legal framework in the human rights and minority protection issues in Bulgaria. Although, the
President signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the
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Parliament ratified in 1999, the Constitutional restrictions on the rights of minorities contradicted
with these new provisions.
The Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court in Bulgaria consists of 12 members, who are selected by the
President, thus have an ideological stand. Although the Constitution forbids the formation of
political parties along religious, ethnic or racial lines, the mainly ethnic Turkish Movement for
Rights and Freedoms (MRF) is represented in Parliament, and the other major parties generally
accept its right to participate in the political process. By way of contrast, in February 2000, the
Constitutional Court ruled that the United Macedonian Organization (OMO) political party is
unconstitutional on the grounds that it promotes separatism.248
Additionally, there have been several unsuccessful attempts on the part of the Socialist
(former Communist) Party to challenge the Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms Party
(MRF) before the court. Between 1990 to1996, the Socialists once approached the Constitutional
Court with questions about the MRF’s legitimacy and made petitions. However, the choice of
proportional representation created a situation in which the MRF provided the swing vote in the
first elections (1990 – 1994). 249 Hence, both major parties, the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the
Union of Democratic Forces, followed policies designed to make them a plausible coalition
partner of the MRF. 250
The Constitutional Court also rejected the claim by MRF Party on the 1996 Law on Radio
and Television. Although the law did not ban minority languages clearly, it required broadcasting
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in Bulgarian only.251 This showed how easily the Turkish television and radio channels in Bulgaria
at the local and regional level would be banned. However, the Constitutional Court did not find
this article challenging. The amendments of the law introduced in 1997 did not address the issue
of minority media.
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However, the law was limited to the state radio and television, which

indirectly opens the possibility for the creation of regional and local minority media. It was not
until July of 1998 that the Bulgarian Parliament added a provision allowing for the broadcast of
programs in foreign languages aired for Bulgarian citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian.
253

Although this has been a good opportunity for the Turkish minorities, the unfavorable

economic situation of the Roma and the lack of support from a mother country, in contrast to the
case of the Turkish minority, did not allow the creation of Roma broadcast channels. With the
recommendations from the European Commission, in October 2000 Bulgarian national television
launched Turkish-language newscasts. 254
4.6.3. Mobilization of the Minorities
In the case of Bulgaria, the major difference between the two ethnic groups analyzed here,
appears to be their ability to mobilize. The ethnic groups that succeeded in getting support from
international community to advocate their interests in Bulgaria at both local and national level,
mostly took the advantage of the negotiating period before Bulgaria’s entry to the European
Union.
For the ethnic Turks, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms has been the main advocate.
One of the main lines of activities of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Parliament was to
251
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introduce the Turkish language as a compulsory subject in some municipal schools. This idea
began to be a movement supported by Turks after the collapse of the Communist regime. As of
1991, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms supported a boycott of the schools, which was
aimed at the institution of the study of Turkish as a mother tongue against the prevention of
teaching minority languages in Turkish districts of Kurdzhali and Razgrad. 255 This movement can
be considered as the roots of the fact that Turkish became an unrestricted language either in
education or in broadcasting with the EU candidacy of Bulgaria. With the efforts of MRF,
education in Turkish language in the municipal schools has always been in the political agenda.
Especially during the Communist regime in Bulgaria, Turkish activists were imprisoned
frequently. In the 1970s, there were reports of imprisonment of Turkish teachers and prominent
Turkish intellectuals for protesting against the closure of the Turkish language schools. In 1976,
there were reports of joint demonstrations of Turks and Bulgarian Muslims in the Plovdiv area for
the discrimination against the Muslims in employment and at the closing of mosques. 256 The legal
ground for these arrests were Articles 108 and 109 of the Bulgarian Criminal Code, dealing
respectively with “anti-state agitation and propaganda” and “forming or leading an organization
aimed at committing crimes against the People’s Republic of Bulgaria.” 257
The MRF is essentially a party of the Bulgarian Turks, though it has never admitted it
openly in official documents or in its public activity. Almost 90 per cent of its membership and
more than 90 per cent of its voters are ethnic Turks. There are other Turkish parties, which are not
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so successful and have ideological and political arguments with the MRF.

258

The traditional

moderate attitude of the MRF between the BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party) and the UDF (Union of
Democratic Forces), which was founded in 1989 as a union of several political organizations in
opposition to the communist government of Zhivkov has made the movement successful.259 Also,
the MRF got involved in the adoption of some draft legislation that affected the socioeconomic
interests of that community.260 The success of the MRF depended on its relations with the major
political parties. For instance, in 1991-2, the MRF supported the UDF (Union of Democratic
Forces) minority government and later on it had contributed to the downfall of this same
government. 261 After that, together with the BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party), it supported a nonpartisan expert government where the MRF got one ministerial seat. 262 All this shows that the
MRF became a platform which provided ground for political mobilization of ethnic Turks.
However, the MRF have never demanded for territorial autonomy and stressed its wish for cultural
rights to be able to last longer in the restrictive political environment of Bulgaria. 263
The analysis of the Roma community compared to that of Turks in Bulgaria shows that the
situation of the Roma community was even worse, since they do not have strong political
representation. 264 Thus, the Roma population in Bulgaria has been subject to discrimination in all
spheres of social life. This situation is a result of both the government policies and of the general
negative attitudes towards the Roma in the Bulgarian society. Furthermore, all types of
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discrimination have been consolidated with lack of mobilization among ethnic Roma in Bulgaria.
This lack of mobilization among Roma has been an obstacle for implementation of policies. Thus,
for example, implementation of the Framework Program for the Integration of Roma in Bulgarian
Society were ignored until 2002, which was adopted with a decision of the Bulgarian Council of
Ministers in April 1999 after the agreement between representatives of the more than 70 Roma
associations and the Bulgarian government. 265
This Framework requires fighting ethnic discrimination in education, health care, regional
and urban planning, and sports through the introduction of effective anti-discriminatory clauses.
266

It also required formation of a commission to investigate complaints against illegal

discriminatory actions by police officers, desegregation of Roma schools and the study of the
mother tongue as well training Romani language and fighting racism at school. 267 Obviously the
governments have been unwilling, however, Roma failed to mobilize for becoming citizens with
equal rights in Bulgaria.
Although they failed to actively engage in lobbying for the rights of Roma, various NGOs
for the protection of Roma rights have been established. The Roma Democratic Union/United
Roma Organization was the first Roma organization established after 1989. 268 It was founded in
1990 and had some 50,000 members by 1991. It has declared itself as a non-party union of all
Roma in Bulgaria, interested in the housing and education problems, as well as the political and
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social representation of Roma.269 Although it could not register as an ethnic political party
according to the Bulgarian Constitution, it was allowed to function as a social and cultural
organization.270
Another non-governmental organization, the Human Rights Project founded in 1992, is
known as the most active group working for the protection of Roma rights in Bulgaria. It was the
first organization of its kind in Bulgaria that aims to monitor respect for the human rights of the
Roma, their violation, and to provide legal help.
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One of the few cases, in which Roma

organizations have been active is the Assenov vs. Bulgaria case, in which a Roma sued a state
because of police maltreatment, in which the European Court of Human Rights decided in favor of
Assenov by stating that his rights were violated. 272
4.7. Post-Accession Developments in Bulgaria about Minority Protection
As discussed above, the experiences of Turks and Roma population had been different in
the candidacy period of Bulgaria. While the Turks succeeded in getting recognition,
representation and more rights, the Roma population of Bulgaria consolidated their
disadvantaged position in terms of economic prosperity, political rights and social integration.
Thus, similar to the findings of the Latvian case, the analysis of pre-accession period of Bulgaria
showed that Bulgaria acceded to the European Union in 2007 without fully adapting the “ acquis

communitaire”, specifically on human rights and minority protection issues.
The analysis of the post-accession period between 2007-2012 shows that Roma in Bulgaria
continued facing discrimination in all spheres of social life including high unemployment rate, bad
economic conditions, and the lack of proper education. European Network against Racism
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(ENAR), which is a network of European NGOs that combats racism and promotes anti-racist
policy development in the European Union describes Roma as the group most discriminated
against in Bulgaria.
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ENAR also notes that the Roma's "access to basic human rights, social

inclusion, and personal development, is hindered by long-lasting poverty, and a hostile public
climate". 274
The reports of several human rights agencies such as Amnesty International and Bulgarian
Helsinki Committee state that the most stringent problem of the state and Roma relation is the ill
treatment and excessive use of force by the police against the Roma. Thus, the high crime rate
among the Roma population has been the biggest factor determining their relations with the state
and the rest of society. A violent anti-Roma launched in September 2012, which was related to the
Roma stereotype perception of the Bulgarian society after an incident in Katunitza, in which a
Bulgarian teenager was killed by a Roma driver.
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The far right-wing party Ataka held

demonstrations and demanded tough action from the government, even calling for the death
penalty to be reinstated in Bulgaria. 276 Although incitement to racial hatred and discriminatory
public communication are prohibited under Bulgarian law, lack of enforcement for these
provisions are widespread in Bulgaria, which can be counted as one of the most important reasons
for Bulgaria’s non-compliance with the EU “acquis” in human rights issues, even five years after
the accession.
The positions of the governments are also very important in these types of racist
movements, which may increase or ease the tensions. Thus, in this specific case of anti-Roma
movement in Bulgaria, the tensions increased with the ignorant attitudes of the government led
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by Prime Minister Boyko Borisov. Although the situation of Turks has been considered to be better
than Roma based on the various reports of human rights groups, any anti-Roma movement in
Bulgaria cause panic among other minorities especially the Turks as the largest ethnic group.
Thus, after the anti-Roma rallies in 2012, the far-right Ataka Party provoked clashes with Muslims,
who gathered for Friday prayer at a mosque in Sofia, protesting against the use of loudspeakers to
issue the call to prayer. 277 However, shortly after, the ruling center-right political party Citizens
for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) proposed a declaration adopted by the parliament
which condemned the attack on the mosque. 278
Despite these negative developments, the National Roma Integration Strategy of the
Republic of Bulgaria 2012-2020 was adopted by the National Assembly in March 2012.
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The

Strategy states that it follows the EU framework for National Roma Integration, and it is
reportedly in keeping with the National Action Plan for the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015.
280

Thus, Bulgaria is a participant in the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015, which is an

international initiative of 12 European countries to improve the socio-economic conditions of
Roma in partnership with NGOs and intergovernmental agencies including, the World Bank, the
UNDP and the Council of Europe. 281
As discussed in the findings of pre-accession period, the ‘mobilization of ethnic minorities’
appeared to be a significant variable to explain the impact of domestic factors in Europeanization
process. The political representation, which is directly related to the mobilization of ethnic
minorities explains the current situation of Roma in Bulgaria. According to the results of the most
277
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recent parliamentary elections in 2009, there were 29 members of minority groups, who were 26
ethnic Turks, and one Roma representative in the National Assembly. There was one ethnic
Turkish minister in the cabinet. 282 Thus, while the ethnic Turkish minority was well represented,
Roma were underrepresented, particularly in appointed leadership positions.
Although, both the ethnic Turks and Roma held elected positions at the local level, antiRoma incidents shadowed their success. For instance, in June 2012, a bomb placed in a bag
exploded in Sandanski in front of a cafe owned by the local leader of pro-Roma political party
called Evroroma.283 Thus, in the post-accession period of Bulgaria, despite the lack of mobilization
among Roma due to fear, economic instability and lack of support, we see a rise in far-right
extremism in Bulgaria that promoted anti-Roma sentiment.

284

For example, the Bulgarian

National Guard, which was established in 2007, states its mission as protecting Bulgarians against
Roma ‘terror’. 285 According to the UNHCR report, the Guard participates in a weekly television
show and publishes a monthly newspaper, without being punished for their anti-Roma rhetoric
and calling Roma people as ‘gypsy parasites’.
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The other anti-Roma political party Ataka is

described as ‘ultra-nationalistic’, ‘far-right nationalist’ or ‘xenophobic’.
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Although, the party

promotes anti-Roma sentiments, it finished fourth in both the 2005 and 2009 elections, securing
21 seats in both years and even won 2 seats in the 2009 election for the European Parliament. 288

282

“Bulgaria opposition wins election”, BBC News, July 6, 2009, accessed March 1, 2013,
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8134851.stm
283

“Rights Wing Terrorism, 2013”, European Police Office, accessed March 2, 2013,
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europol_te-sat2013_lr_0.pdf
284
Dyankova and Ilareva. Racism and Related Discriminatory Practices in Bulgaria, 35.
285
“Bulgaria: Situation of Roma, including access to employment, housing, health care, and
education; state efforts to improve the conditions of Roma”, UNHCR, October 19, 2012, accessed
March 2, 2013, www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,BGR,,50a9ed2f2,0.html
286
Ibid.
287
“Human Rights in Bulgaria in 2011”, Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, (Sofia: Bulgarian Helsinki
Committee, 2012), 47.
288
Ibid.
102

The analysis of minority protection issues in the post-accession period of Bulgaria shows
that the ethnic groups, namely Turks, which succeeded in taking advantage of Europeanization in
the pre-accession period continued to mobilize and get political representation. As mentioned
above, the Turks ended up with 29 representatives in the National Assembly and one minister in
the cabinet in 2009 elections in Bulgaria. On the other hand, the Roma population has one
representative in the National Assembly today in Bulgaria. The anti-Roma attitudes supported
with the right-wing parties worsened with ignorant center-right governments after 2007. Despite
the several provisions ratified by the governments between 2007 and 2012 such as the National
Roma Integration Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria 2012-2020, lack of enforcement for these
provisions constructs situation of Roma as of 2012.
4.8. Conclusion: Europeanization of Minority Protection Policies in Bulgaria and the
Integration of the Turks and Roma
The accession negotiations of the EU with Bulgaria were successfully concluded in
December 2004 and the Accession Treaty was signed in April 2005. Thus, Bulgaria became a
member of European Union on January 1st 2007. The last reports that declared the successful
accession of Bulgaria in European Union still addressed the problems needing to be solved about
ethnic minorities.
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Although the candidacy process of Bulgaria supported ethnic Turks to

become integrated in the society, improvements for Roma population were still needed according
to the European Commission.
The analysis of the domestic factors show that the governments served during the time
frame of analysis have not been interested in minority protection policies although the EU
membership has been on the agenda of all of them. According to the European Commission
Monitoring Report of 2006, some progress was made in the area of the protection and integration
289
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of the Roma minority. 290 However, substantial efforts were still needed to promote the social
inclusion and integration of Roma into Bulgarian society. Living conditions need to be improved.
Further efforts were needed to combat all forms of intolerance, particularly by fully applying
existing legislation on broadcasting and other activities aiming to combat any form of racism,
discrimination, or xenophobia. Also, the health status of the population and the lack of access to
health care, especially at the regional level and among poorer socioeconomic groups and
minorities, were criticized by the European Commission. 291 Concerning anti-discrimination, there
were several attempts in pre-accession period such as the Commission for Protection against
Discrimination was established in 2005 in Bulgaria, Framework Program for Equal Integration of
Roma in Bulgarian Society or the independent Commission for Protection against Discrimination.
292

Furthermore, a strategy focusing on the education of school children of minorities including

amendments to the National Education Law, came into force, starting from the school year
2003/2004 and the Ministry of Education and Science issued instructions for desegregation of
Roma in schools both in 2002 and 2003.
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Similarly, there have been other efforts from the

center-right governments in the post-accession period, such as National Roma Integration
Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria 2012-2020. However, the analysis of both pre-accession and
post-accession periods of Bulgaria lack reveals that lack of enforcement for the provisions related
to minority protection issues mostly have been affecting Roma population in Bulgaria. In other
words, ignorant position of the governments served between 1997-2007 and 2007-2012 hindered
Europeanization of minority protection policies in Bulgaria.
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The Constitutional Court as the effective institution has been acting against the European
Union’s requirements for minority protection with its decisions. The ban on the United
Macedonian Organization (OMO) political party as unconstitutional on the grounds that it
promotes separatism and the rejection of the claim by the MRF Party concerning the 1996 Law on
Radio and Television, which banned broadcasting in minority languages as it included a
requirement that broadcasts can only be transmitted in Bulgarian are two major decision by the
Constitutional Court of Bulgaria that slowed down the Europeanization of minority protection
policies in Bulgaria.
On the whole, my analysis on Europeanization of minority protection policies in Bulgaria
during the time frame between 1997-2007 continue to address the situation of the ethnic
minorities, in particular, Roma population, as they are affected not only by actors of the
governments and the significant institutions but also from their inability to mobilize in contrast to
the ethnic Turks. Taking advantage of the integration of Bulgaria to the Europe and European
Union, the Turkish minorities succeeded to be integrated into political life through elected
representation at national and local levels in Bulgaria. However, as stated in all European
Commission progress reports between 1997-2007, it is not possible to talk about a perfect
compliance for Bulgaria to the human rights and minority protection acquis of the European
Union although it ended up with accession similar to the case study of Latvia. This analysis is
consistent with the developments during post-accession period of Bulgaria. As discussed before,
the Turkish population continued gaining more seats in the Parliament, as well as recognition and
rights due to successful mobilization, while the Roma community remained in their disadvantaged
situation. As a matter of fact, the analysis of Bulgaria also supports my theory of the impact of
domestic factors on Europeanization process, as it shows the significance of the domestic factors
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on the Europeanization process in minority protection despite the EU conditionality for
membership.
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CHAPTER 5
KURDS IN TURKEY
Turkey is a republican parliamentary democracy. As part of the EU accession process,
Turkey is required to adopt the legal framework on anti-discrimination to harmonize its legal
framework with the EU acquis communautaire like all other candidate states. However, the
Turkish constitution has no reference to the word ‘minority’. The status of minorities in Turkey is
established by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which defines minorities on the basis of religion. 294
Therefore it only covers non-Muslims not Kurds who are also Muslim.295 Thus, there is no
legislative framework for minorities in Turkey, either directly through laws granting minority
rights or indirectly through an anti-discrimination law. So, the rights of every citizen are protected
under a general equality provision by law which is not applied to all circumstances in practice.
Nevertheless, as the Constitution does not recognize ethnic minorities, the Kurds who are
the largest minority group in Turkey have been ignored both politically and legally, despite the
fact that Turkey is the state that has the biggest Kurdish population in Middle East.296 Thus, the
political space of Turkey has been ethnically restrictive, which prevented Kurds to mobilize as an
ethnic group.297 The state policy of Turkey throughout history towards the Kurds can be best
explained by the speech of Turgut Ozal. As one of the former Prime Minister and President of
Turkey, Turgut Ozal, who supported the limited rights for Kurds, stated that the best solution for
this problem would be assimilation of Kurds.298 These suppressive policies of Turkey provided a
ground for the Kurdish guerilla group, Kurdistan Worker’s Party, or in Kurdish, Partiya Karkerên
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Kurdistan (PKK) to gain support from the Kurds, who have problems of living their identity.299
5.1. Brief History of Kurds in Turkish Republic
The Kurds have been the most important minority group in Turkey since the foundation of
the Republic in 1923. The size of the Kurdish population has been perceived as a threat for the
unity of the state. Also, the presence of the Kurdish population in the neighboring states further
consolidated the fear of Kurdish identity in Turkey. Since the 1930s, Kurds have resisted
government policies to assimilate them.300 The governments’ main strategy for assimilating the
Kurds has been language suppression. Yet, despite official attempts over several decades to
spread Turkish among them, most Kurds have retained their native language specifically Kurmanji,
which is used by the majority of Kurds, and Zazaki, which is spoken in southeastern Turkey as well
as in parts of Iran. 301
Despite these policies, during the 1960s and 1970s, Kurdish intellectuals attempted to
publish Kurdish-language journals and newspapers. However, none of these publications survived
for more than a few issues because of legal bans. 302 Prior to the 1980 military coup, government
authorities considered Kurdish one of the unnamed languages banned by law. Use of Kurdish was
strictly prohibited in all government institutions, including the courts and schools.
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Between

1980 and 1983, the military government passed several laws expressly banning the use of Kurdish
and the possession of written or audio materials in Kurdish. 304
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Table 5.1.Total Population and the Percentage of Ethnic Minorities in Turkey305

YEAR: 2012

Population

Percentage
Minorities
Population

of
in

Ethnic
overall

Kurds 14.29 million (18 %)
TURKEY

79.4 million

Others (Armenian, Greek,
Roma, Jews, Laz,
Georgian, Bulgarian,
Azeris ) 5.55 million (7 %)

5.2. Political and Violent Struggle of Kurds after 1980s in Turkey
After the unsuccessful attempts for integration of the Kurdish population into the society
by the discriminatory policies towards Kurds, since 1984 Kurds followed both a peaceful political
struggle and a violent armed movement to obtain rights in Turkey. The leaders of the nonviolent
struggle have worked within the political system for the recognition of Kurdish cultural rights,
such as linguistic rights for using Kurdish in public, reading, writing, and publishing. Prior to 1991,
these Kurds operated within the mainstream political parties of left wing such as Social
Democratic Populist Party (SHP) and Republican People's Party (CHP). 306 Although the Kurdish
representatives succeeded in getting seats in the Parliament by joining these parties, they could
not fight for the rights of Kurds due to legal obstacles and public opinion. Following the
parliamentary elections in 1991, famous Kurdish deputies, including Hatip Dicle, and Leyla Zana,
formed the People's Labor Party (HEP), a party with the explicit goal of campaigning within the
National Assembly for the equal rights for the Kurds.307
In Ozal government, that served between 1983 and 1989, the term Kurd was used for
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describing the people living in eastern part of Turkey. 308 However, the term ‘Kurd’ or ‘Kurdish’ in
was still prohibited in government institutions such as the courts and schools. Right after the death
of Ozal in 1993, the Constitutional Court issued its decision, declaring People's Labor Party (HEP)
as an illegal political party. 309 In anticipation of this outcome, the Kurdish deputies had resigned
from the People's Labor Party (HEP) only days before and formed a new organization, the
Democracy Party (DEP). When the DEP was banned in June 1994, Kurdish deputies formed the
new People's Democracy Party (Halkin Demokrasi Partisi or HADEP). 310
The initiation of armed insurrection by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkere
Kurdistan or PKK) in 1984 was the beginning of recognition of the minority problem by Turkey's
political elite as well. 311 The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which does not represent all of the
Kurds, sought to establish an independent Marxist state in southeastern Turkey, where the
majority of the Kurdish population lives. The armed attacks targeted mostly the Turkish army units
and elite police forces. 312 The violence increased after 1991, with PKK guerrillas from camps in
Syria, Iran, and Iraq, as well as from inside Turkey itself, attacking Turkish military and police
outposts and targeting civilian community leaders and teachers.
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In the later years, the

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) sought military targets outside the southeastern region of Turkey
as well as Turkish diplomats and businessmen in West European cities, particularly in Germany,
where more than one million Kurds live. 314 The extreme violence of the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK)'s methods enabled the government to portray the PKK as a terrorist organization and to
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justify its own discriminatory policies including the destruction of about 850 border villages and
the forced removal of their populations to western Turkey. The peak of violent attacks of the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) had been between 1984 and 1990, when the governments forcibly
displaced a large number of residents from the villages in the southeast. The statistics show that
there were from one to three million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) during this process. 315
Table 5.2. Timeline of Important Political Events in Turkey
Year

Political Event

1923

Foundation of Republic of Turkey
Turkey abandoned Kemalist neutralist policy

1952

and joins Nato.

1960

Military Coup against ruling Democratic Party.
New constitution established two-chamber

1961

parliament.
Association agreement signed with European

1963

Economic Community (EEC).

1974

Turkish troops invaded northern Cyprus
Military Coup

1980

New constitution created seven-year

1982

presidency, and single house Parliament.
General election won by Turgut Ozal's

1983

Motherland Party (ANAP).
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) launched

1984

separatist guerrilla war in Southeast Turkey.

1987

Turkey applied for full EEC membership.
20,000 Turkish troops entered Kurdish safe

1992
1993
315

havens in Iraq in anti-PKK operation.
Tansu Ciller became Turkey's first woman prime
minister, and the ceasefire with Kurdistan
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1995

Worker’s Party (PKK) broke down.
Turkey entered EU customs union.
Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan

1996

headed first pro-Islamic government since
1923.
Coalition resigned after campaign led by the

1997

military, replaced by a new coalition led by the
centre-right Motherland Party.

1998

Pro-Islamist Welfare Party banned.

1999

PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan captured in
Kenya, received death sentence, later
commuted to life imprisonment.

2000

Ahmet Necdet Sezer became the President.
Constitutional Court banned opposition pro-

2001

Islamic Virtue Party, saying it had become focus
of anti-secular activities.
Parliament approved reforms aimed at securing
EU membership such as removing death

2002

sentence and bans on Kurdish education and
broadcasting.
Islamist-based Justice and Development Party

2002

(AKP) won elections.
For the EU membership, Parliament passed laws

2003

easing restrictions on freedom of speech, and
Kurdish language rights.

2004

State TV broadcasted first Kurdish-language
program, and four Kurdish activists, including
former MP Leyla Zana, freed from jail.
EU membership negotiations officially

2005

launched.
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Kurdish separatist group, the PKK, declared a
2006

unilateral ceasefire in operations against the
military.
EU partially freezed Turkey's membership talks

2006

because of Ankara's failure to open its ports and
airports to Cypriot traffic.

2007

AK Party won parliamentary elections, and
Abdullah Gul is elected as President.
Petition to the Constitutional Court to have the

2008

governing AKP banned for allegedly
undermining the secular constitution failed by a
narrow margin.
Prominent Kurdish politician Ahmet Turk defied
Turkish law by giving speech to parliament in

2009

his native Kurdish. State TV cut live broadcast,
as the language is banned in Parliament.
Ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)

2011

won resounding victory in general election, and
35 Kurdish parliamentarians took seat as well.

5.3. European Union’s Pre-Accession Conditionality and Demands from Turkey on Minority
Protection Issues
The annual progress reports of the European Commission, which are published for tracing
the Europeanization in various policy areas, focuses on the human rights and minority protection
under two titles for the case of Turkey. The two specific topics related to minority protection in
Turkey are specifies as cultural rights and political rights.
5.3.1. Cultural Rights
The European Commission states that as far as the cultural rights, especially use of
languages other than Turkish is concerned for no particular problems have been reported for
113

citizens belonging to minorities covered by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, including Jews, Armenians,
Greeks. However for those belonging to groups that are outside the scope of the Lausanne Treaty,
such as the Kurds, can not enjoy cultural rights.
As a candidate for the European Union since 1999, Turkey has never been willing to
consider any ethnical groups with a cultural identity and common traditions as “national
minorities”, and thus members of such groups have been clearly still largely denied certain basic
rights.

316

Cultural rights for all Turks, irrespective of their ethnic origin, such as the right to

broadcast in their mother tongue, to learn their mother tongue, or to receive instruction in their
mother tongue, are not guaranteed. Ethnic minorities, especially Kurds, are not allowed to give
their children names of their choosing. In practice, some names are sometimes not accepted by
the population registrar's personnel. 317
Furthermore, other issues related to language such as broadcasting and education have
been problems for Kurds as well. The state law Number 3984 stipulates that radio and television
broadcasts will be in Turkish, with an exception for languages that will contribute to the
development of universal culture and science.

318

In the field of education at all levels, no

language other than Turkish is allowed for teaching purposes.

319

The European Commission

requires Turkey to allow the enjoyment of cultural rights for all Turks irrespective of their ethnic
origin, in particular the population of Kurdish origin.
5.3.2. Political Participation
In addition to the problems with the cultural rights, the European Commission progress
reports on Turkey since 1999 has indicated that, the Kurds, as the citizens of Turkey, are not given
316
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opportunities to express their views on such issues. In the case of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin,
it should be mentioned that the expression of pro-Kurdish views was still problematic for the
Turkish State. There are examples of imprisonment of several Kurdish politicians for expressing
their demand for cultural and political rights. Many mayors from the Southeast belonging to the
pro-Kurdish political party are accused of being linked to the PKK and imprisoned. The executives
of the Kurdish political parties are generally sentenced to imprisonment for their activities, such
as ongoing demonstrations or initiating hunger strikes following Ocalan's capture, who is the
leader of Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). 320 In addition to the problems in participation, several
newspapers and magazines have been forbidden that represented the Kurdish population and
aimed at demanding the rights of this ethnic minority group. Similarly, certain pro-Kurdish
associations have been closed in the region under emergency rule. 321
5.4. Analysis: Turkey’s Compliance with the ‘Acquis Communitaire’ on Minority Protection
This case study covers Turkey’s Europeanization process since it became an official
candidate state for European Union membership in 1999 until the most recent European
Commission’s annual progress report in 2012. I look at the influence of the ‘position of the
government’, ‘significant institutions’ and ‘mobilization of minorities’ on the Europeanization of
minority protection policies in Turkey.
5.4.1. The position of the governments
The governments that have served after Turkey’s official candidacy to European Union
have been influencing Europeanization process in human rights issues. Although the minority
protection policies in Turkey have been Europeanized slower than required by the European
320
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Union, the developments accelerated with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government
after 2002. (See Table 5.3 for political parties and their ideologies in Turkey)
Table 5.3. Major Political Parties and Their Ideologies in Turkey322
Name

Abbreviation

Ideology

Justice and Development Party

AKP

Right-wing

Republican People’s Party

CHP

Center-right

National Action Party

MHP

Right-wing, Nationalist

Peace and Democracy Party

BDP

Pro-Kurdish Party

Democrat Party

DP

Center-right

During the Ecevit government between 1999 and 2002, the European Commission’s
annual progress reports on Turkey drew a negative picture of Turkey in terms of human rights and
the protection of minorities, especially Kurds. Initially, Turkey’s restriction on the Kurdish
language is referred to an obstacle for Kurds using and sustaining their native language which is a
part of their cultural traditions.
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Thus, TV broadcasting in Kurdish at least for non-political

programs should be tolerated and officially allowed, according to the European Commission.324
Accordingly, the Ecevit government had not been interested in signing the Council of Europe
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Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and recognizing minorities other
than those defined by the Lausanne Treaty, which are only non-Muslims. 325
The political participation right was another matter of concern as a few parliamentarians
of Kurdish origin was imprisoned. Regarding freedom of expression, the reports are consistently
more pessimistic, especially in the aftermath of the Öcalan’s capture in1999. 326 According to the
European Commission, using certain terminology in relation to the Kurdish question in press
releases and publications by public institutions and organizations was restricted by the
government.327 The expression of pro-Kurdish views was still against the Turkish Constitution.
Accordingly, the political participation of Kurds was still problematic. At that time, three mayors
from the Southeast belonging to the pro-Kurdish HADEP Party were accused of being linked to
the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and imprisoned. People's Democracy Party (HADEP) as a
minority political party also frequently faced difficulties from the authorities, including police
investigations.
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Several newspapers and magazines have been forbidden and certain pro-

Kurdish associations have been closed in the region.329 Although the celebration of the Newroz
(Kurdish New Year) in that region without major incident was important, it was still banned
elsewhere, including Istanbul.330
As a center-right conservative political party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government, that has served from 2002 until today has brought acceleration to Europeanization
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process in minority protection issues in Turkey. One of these positive signs is regarding the
enjoyment of cultural rights in the Southeast Turkey, such as a festival with no ban on bands
singing in Kurdish. Also, previously banned journals and newspapers were allowed to publish
again. Thus, 2002 is important as the state of emergency was lifted from the Southeastern region
at this time. Certainly, the imprisonment of Ocalan and, accordingly, the weakening of the
Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) had a big impact on these improvements.331 However, in terms of
political representation, the electoral system is criticized by the European Commission for making
it difficult for minorities to be represented in Parliament. In the election of November 2002, for
example, the Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) did not reach the ten percent threshold, despite
receiving over 45 percent of the votes in five of Turkey’s 81 provinces.332
Despite the problems in political representation, the AKP government launched a new
policy for Kurdish guerilla group. In 2003, the Parliament adopted a "Reintegration Law" offering
reduced prison sentences to combatants belonging to the PKK and other terrorist organizations as
identified by the Government, in case they agree to lay down their weapons and provide
information to authorities. 333 Just three days after the law, 760 people who were either prisoners
or active militants already applied for benefits under the law.334 Although the AKP government
have been seeking a peaceful solution for the armed mobilization of Kurds to some degree,
political participation continued to be problematic, especially during the first years of the AKP
government. The Government restricted the activities of some political parties and leaders, closed
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the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HADEP), and sought to close the related Democratic
People's Party (DEHAP).
In terms of the cultural rights, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments’
policies have been towards the removal of the restrictions although the implementation of the
policies in local governments has been problematic. Kurds were prevented from registering their
newborn children with Kurdish names. In some cases, charges were filed against the parents. In
2003, the Parliament amended an article of the Census Law that had been used to prevent the use
of Kurdish names. This amendment included a different wording for explanation of the “names”
that opened a door for using Kurdish names.335 The original law prohibited the use of names
contrary to the ‘culture’ or ‘customs and traditions’, but the amended law instead prohibited
names contrary to ‘moral norms’ or that ‘offend the public’. 336 The revised wording was intended
to ease the restrictions. However, according to the human rights advocates the local authorities
failed to adjust these practices. 337
The year 2004 is when Turkey started negotiations with the EU in order to become a
member. The 2004 report of European Commission is one of the longest reports on Turkey in
terms of its references to minority rights. In regard to the protection of cultural rights, the
Constitution has been amended, lifting the ban on the use of languages other than Turkish.
Legislative changes have been introduced, allowing for radio and TV broadcasting and teaching in
languages other than Turkish, including Kurdish.
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Besides, a regulation entitled ‘Teaching in

Different Languages and Dialects Traditionally Used by Turkish Citizens in their Daily Lives’
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entered into force which allowed for the first time private courses in Kurdish.

339

Six private

schools started teaching Kurdish with some restrictions. Also, the Newroz celebrations were
authorized everywhere. On the other hand, some Kurdish politicians were prosecuted for
speaking Kurdish during the campaign for the March 2004 local elections. 340 However, the
provisions that allow broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, giving private courses in
Kurdish and other non-Turkish languages "used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives", generated
some bureaucratic obstacles. The local authorities in Sanliurfa, Batman, and Van provinces
withheld permission to open Kurdish language courses on a number of technical issues, including
a requirement that the applicants change the names of the institutions. 341
On the other hand, the Turkish Public Television (TRT) started broadcasting in five
languages, including Kurdish although the duration and scope of its national broadcast is very
limited. For instance, broadcasting educational programs teaching the Kurdish language are not
allowed. As all the private schools teaching Kurdish were closed, and the public schools were not
allowed to teach Kurdish, the opportunities for learning Kurdish has been almost impossible in
Turkey, which in turn further supported the assimilation of the Kurds by forcing them using only
Turkish.342
Despite all the problems in implementation of the laws that the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) government introduced, the perception of the government by the Kurdish population
has been positive. During Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Diyarbakir in 2005, that is the most
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important Kurdish city in Turkey, because of its population, he was welcomed due to the relatively
more open and tolerant approaches of the AKP government to Kurdish rights and identity. 343
However, due to lack of enforcement for these new provisions in Turkey, the popularity of
the AKP government has been decreasing among the Kurdish community. Because of the slow
pace of reform in the following years, the attitudes towards the AKP government faced a massive
boycott during visits to the Southeastern part of Turkey. 344 This growing Kurdish reaction was
reflected in the municipal elections in 2009 when AKP lost in the Southeast Turkey to the
Democratic Society Party (DTP), the main pro-Kurdish party, which campaigned on a platform of
Kurdish cultural identity. The DTP captured mayoral seats in nine provincial capitals out of 81
provinces and took control of 19 municipalities in Eastern part of Turkey, where the majority of
the Kurds are living. 345
The poor performance of Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the cities of large
Kurdish population, and the pressure from the European Union required addressing ethnic
minorities’ problem specifically Kurdish concerns more seriously. The result was the government’s
‘Kurdish Opening’ strategy that can be considered as the most important the initiative to address
the Kurdish issue since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. 346 Under this strategy, the Higher
Education Board (YÖK) endorsed the application from a Turkish University to establish a ‘Living
Languages Institute’ which would provide post graduate education in Kurdish. 347 Thus, during the
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local election campaign, politicians and political parties used Kurdish in political activities.
Although the use of any language other than Turkish in political life is illegal under the Law on
Elections and Political Parties, in most such cases no legal action was launched. Restrictions on the
private local and regional TV and radio programs were still valid. 348
Although the ‘Kurdish Opening’ initiative of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government has been perceived as a very positive step by the European Union and the
international community, AKP government has not been successful in managing the integration of
the Kurdish problem within the Turkish community through the ‘Kurdish Opening’ strategy. A
majority of the Turks perceive Kurds as terrorists and their demand for cultural and political rights
as threats against the Turkish Republic. 349 Due to the electoral concerns, AKP government could
not push for further developments in the minority issues significantly.
5.4.2. Significant Institutions
The presidents
The president is elected directly for a five-year term, who is also eligible for a second term
in Turkey. The profiles of the two presidents, who served during the time frame of the analysis
between 1999 and 2012, are significantly different. Ahmet Necdet Sezer was the tenth president
of the Turkish Republic that served between 2000 and 2007. The President Sezer had a Kemalist
institutional background in the judiciary, and his presidency was in many ways deﬁned by a
mission to prevent the right wing AKP government’s policies.
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depends on founder of Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s views requires a secular state
united as a single ethnic society, namely as Turkish. 351
As a strong supporter of the Kemalist state ideology, the President Sezer never recognized
AKP governments’ policies towards Kurdish minorities. Even the presence of Kurds in the
neighboring states and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was ignored by the President Sezer.
352

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is the governing body of the Kurdistan Region in the

Northern Iraq, where the majority of the Kurds live, with a unicameral Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament
(IKP) with 111 seats. Since the foundation of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 1992, the
Turkish military strongly opposed formal contact with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG),
which is an attitude shared by many high ranking Kemalist officials.
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During his presidency,

Ahmet Necdet Sezer refused to officially receive his counterpart Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) President Massoud Barzani, as he was rather a ‘tribal chief’ and thus not an acceptable
partner for a dialogue with high-ranking Turkish officials. 354
The next president, Abdullah Gul, has been serving after 2007 as the 11th President of the
Turkish Republic. Before inauguration, the President Abdullah Gul served as the Prime Minister of
AKP government in 2002-2003. As he was one of the founders of the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) and not from a political background of Kemalist ideology, his presidency has been
supportive of the provisions and policies that AKP government introduced for the rights of the
ethnic minorities.
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The AKP strategy of the ‘Kurdish Opening’ (a.k.a the Democratic Opening or Initiative),
was announced by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with the support of the President
Abdullah Gul in 2009. In his speech given to media, the President Gul declared that the biggest
political problem of the Turkish Republic was the Kurdish question and the ‘Kurdish Opening’ was
an opportunity that should not be missed as a plan designed to solve the problem. 355
Thus, not only did the President Gul indicate his interest in the minority protection issues
in Turkey, but he also showed it. Like the political party leaders, he has visited the Southeastern
part of Turkey, where the majority of the Kurds are living. Thus, although Prime Minister Erdogan
was encountered protests in the region during his visit, the Kurds’ attitude towards the President
has been warmer due to his speeches about the recognition and the protection of the rights of
Kurds. 356
Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court of Turkey consists of 17 members who are appointed by the
President from among candidates submitted by plenary assemblies of other courts, the Higher
Education Council, senior government administrators, and lawyers. The judges are appointed for
12-year. 357 With the impact of the President on the selection process, the Constitutional Court
takes an ideological stand.
In the analysis of the impact of institutions in the process of Europeanization in Turkey, the
Constitutional Court appeared as a variable that worked against the initiatives for the protection
of the rights of the ethnic minorities. Under the 1982 Constitution of the Turkish Republic, which
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came into force as a direct result of the 1980 military coup, Turkey’s Constitutional Court is a
stronghold of Kemalist-statist interests and an active defender of Turkey’s militant secularism. 358
It is vested with the power to order the closure of political parties, whose agenda is found to be
“in conflict with the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, human rights,
national sovereignty, and the principles of the democratic and secular Republic” or when “the
internal functioning and the decisions of political parties contrary to the principles of democracy”.
359

Based on the Kemalist state ideology, the Constitution does not allow political parties founded

on the ground of ethnicity. 360 Thus, the Constitutional Court has been one of the major obstacles
for Europeanization of minority protection polices by preventing the political representation of
the Kurds in the Parliament during the candidacy period of Turkey in 1999 until 2012. After
deliberating on the issue for more than two years, in 2009 the Constitutional Court, suddenly
banned the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). 361
The reason behind this decision of the Constitutional Court was the close association of
the party with the guerilla group Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). The Chairman Ahmet Türk and
another legislator Aysel Tugluk were expelled from Parliament, and 35 other party members were
banned from joining any political party for five years.
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This decision from the Constitutional

Court came right after the declaration of the Kurdish Opening initiative by the AKP government,
strongly supported by the President Gul. Although another pro-Kurdish political party, the Peace
and Democracy Party (BDP) quickly took the DTP’s place, the state-ordered banning of the
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Democratic Society Party (DTP) has reinforced the ‘constitutional’ obstacles towards the equal
treatment of ethnic minorities, even as practical initiatives proceed. Thus, this decision of the
Constitutional Court slowed down the Democratic Initiative for a long time. The European
Union released a statement, expressing concern over the court's ruling and urging Turkey to
change its policies towards political parties which resulted with major protests throughout Kurdish
communities in Turkey. 363
Tracing the process of Europeanization in Turkey between 1999 and 2012, the
Constitutional Court revealed as the most significant domestic variable, which had negatively
affected the process based on the ignorant provisions of the current Constitution for the ethnic
groups.
5.4.3. Mobilization of the Minorities
Mobilization of the ethnic minorities for cultural and political rights in Turkey has
encountered restrictions and legal actions against that are supported by the Constitution of the
Turkish Republic, accordingly the Constitutional Court. Despite all the legal and political
obstacles, Kurdish activists follow two pathways for mobilization: political mobilization and armed
insurgent action.
As the Kurdish issue has always been on the political agenda of the Justice and
Development Party (AKP), the Kurdish community became more engaged in politics in Turkey
after 2002. In July 2003, Parliament revoked Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, which prohibited the
dissemination of separatist propaganda. 364 However, the updated laws still restricted non-violent
expression, and court cases were still being brought against Kurdish writers and publishers, who
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sought for the rights of their community. Despite recent reforms, Turkish legislation still contains
many restrictions on freedom of expression. As they prevent free discussion on the Kurdish
question and possible solutions, these restrictions have led to many Kurdish politicians, mayors
and non-governmental representatives being tried in courts and convicted. 365 These restrictions
on freedom of speech that prevent mobilization of the Kurds violate the European Convention on
Human Rights and are against the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria, thus blocking the process of
Europeanization in Turkey.
In parallel with the AKP policies towards ethnic minorities, there have been important
changes within the Kurdish community in Turkey. The support for the armed struggle has been
declining among Kurds since 1980s. 366 With the possibilities of political representation, the Kurds’
demand for cultural and political rights grounded on the effective use of democratic means. This
view is voiced more and more frequently within Kurdish civil society, which has become more
active with the Kurdish Opening strategy of AKP government. 367
The political rhetoric used by the Kurdish politicians and activists emphasize bilingualism
in education, greater cultural rights, a general amnesty for Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK),
restoring Kurdish names in eastern and southeastern Turkey, and ‘democratic autonomy’ in areas
where Kurds have a majority. 368 These goals are officially declared by the Peace and Democracy
Party (BDP), the largest Kurdish party, and the successor to the banned DTP, which is also
considered to be the political wing of the PKK.
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rhetoric since imprisonment of its leader Ocalan and began to emphasize the cultural-identity
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dimension of the Kurdish problem instead of an independent Kurdish state. The ultimate goal of
the group is consistently declared to be a degree of autonomy with Turkey. 370
In addition to the legal obstacles for the mobilization of the ethnic groups in Turkey, the
pressure from society and political groups against the Kurds are significant as well. 371 The two
mainstream parties in the Turkish Parliament, the National Action Party (MHP) and the
Republican People’s Party (CHP) have been only strongly opposing the Kurdish Opening Initiative
by AKP government but also the political presence of Kurds in the parliament. 372 The Republican
People’s Party (CHP), which is a strong supporter of the Kemalist and Nationalist view, accused
AKP of backing PKK for its separatist goals and violating the constitution, as well as causing an
ethnic polarization in the country. Thus, the National Action Party (MHP), which is the Turkish
nationalist party in the Parliament have been opposing any policies proposed by either the AKP
government or the European Union on the cultural and political rights of minorities in Turkey
based on the view that all citizens of Turkey are ‘Turkish’. 373
The political opposition from the mainstream political parties in the Parliament was
further consolidated by public opinion when the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)’s ‘peace group’
returned home to Turkey with 34 guerillas from northern Iraq with huge welcoming receptions at
the Habur Border with Turkey and later in Diyarbakir.
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throughout Turkey, provoking responses from even moderate ethnic Turks, who perceived the
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affair to be some sort of PKK victory parade. This peace group affair proved that neither the legal
provisions nor the public and the political parties were ready to see the Kurds actively engaged in
the political and cultural spectrum of the Turkish society. 375 Thus, the mobilization of ethnic Kurds
in Turkey can be defined as both a failure and success. As the 30 years of armed insurgency and
growing political representation of Kurds still remain a reality in Turkey today, the mobilization
among Kurds can be considered as successful, and thus supporting my hypothesis. On the other
hand, as neither the PKK nor the political parties or NGOs have been successful enough to bring
Kurds a full array of cultural and political rights, the mobilization of Kurds can be seen as a failure.
5.5. Conclusion
The policy of suppressing of the Kurdish identity and the problems related to this policy
has been on the political agenda in Turkey since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.
The early assimilation policy of the Kemalist state in parallel with the Kemalist state ideology of a
unified state with only ‘one ethnic identity’ met strong resistance among the Kurdish minority and
sparked several outbreaks of unrest, which were violently suppressed, in the Eastern and
Southeastern part of Turkey. In 1984 the issue took on a new dimension when the newly founded
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) began conducting terrorist attacks against Turkish territory from
safe havens in the Qandil Mountains of Northern Iraq.
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The struggle against the Kurdistan

Workers’ Party (PKK) has so far cost 40,000 lives and has hurt both Turkey’s internal development
and its relations with its Western allies, especially the United States. 377
Especially in the most recent years, pressures for greater political and cultural rights have
visibly increased within the Kurdish community in Turkey. Since assuming power in 2002, the AKP
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government has introduced a number of reforms designed to improve relations with the Kurdish
minorities in Turkey. In August 2002, Kurdish-language broadcasting was introduced on a limited
basis. 378 As part of the same reform program, classes conducted in Kurdish were also approved on
a limited basis. These reforms initially helped the AKP improve its political support among the
Kurds, who make up about 20 percent of the Turkish population. In sum, the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government serving after 2002 has been actively engaged with the
problem. In the aftermath of the 2011 election, which has been a victory for the AKP headed by
Prime Minister Erdogan, as he earned more than 50 percent of the votes, the Kurdish issue is likely
to move to the top of the Turkish political agenda as the country seeks to draft a new and more
democratic constitution. As stated before, the current Turkish Constitution ratified in 1982 is the
biggest obstacle for the recognition of another ethnic group other than Turks, as it came into
force as a direct result of the 1980 military coup, and thus is a reflection of Kemalist-statist
interests of a Turkish ‘nation state’. 379
The analysis of Europeanization of minority protection policies in Turkey during the time
frame between 1999 and 2012, indicate that the legal framework of the minority protection
policies is the major problem that blocks the process. Initially, because of the Constitution, the
Kurdish community still is not considered to be recognized ethnic minorities in Turkey. However,
in terms of cultural rights the developments have been promising after the declaration of Turkey’s
EU candidacy. The role of the ‘position of the governments’ are one of the significant variables
that explain the impact of domestic factors on Europeanization process. Thus, the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government has formed the government in 2002 the Constitution has
378

“EU Commission’s Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession 2003”, accessed
March 22,2013,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_en.pdf
379
Ozbudun, and Gençkaya, Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey,
20.
130

been amended, lifting the ban on the use of languages other than Turkish. This is a major
development as Kurdish was not allowed to be used in 1999.

380

However, there are still few

problems concerning the registration of certain Kurdish names. 381 On the other hand, as part of
cultural rights of minorities, celebrations of Newroz, the ‘Kurdish New Year’ are not banned by the
government anywhere in Turkey, which used to be either allowed only in the cities that the
government decides or not allowed at all. 382
On the other hand, as in the previous two case studies on Latvia and Bulgaria, enforcement
of the legal provisions on the rights of ethnic groups is problematic in Turkey. For instance, the
improvements in the education right of Kurds are not necessarily applicable in practice. Although
Turkey allowed private schools to teach Kurdish language with permission, all of these schools
were closed by 2004, which limited the rights of Kurds to learn their language that is impossible in
the public schools.383 The major reason was the financial problems that these schools encountered
due to lack of support from the state funding, as they were private institutions and relatively
disadvantaged economic situation of the Kurds.
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Thus, the educational reforms supported by

the government lacked support from the Kurdish community due to their economic situation, and
ended up with closure of these schools.
Nevertheless, broadcasting in the ethnic language is another part of cultural rights, which
have been mentioned in all annual progress reports published by the European Commission
between 1999 and 2012. The analysis of two different governments before 2002 and after 2002,
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shows that the ‘position of the governments’, in contrast to the ‘significant institutions’, especially
before 2007 (Sezer Presidency), have been supportive of the process at the domestic level.
Moreover, Justice and Development Party (AKP) government succeeded in removing the bans on
newspapers, journals, TV, and radios.
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Initially, under pressure from the EU, the state owned-

channel, TRT, began broadcasting documentaries and news in Kurdish in 2004 only for about 30
minutes each week. 386 Later, Turkey has launched its first 24-hour Kurdish-language TV station,
which is called a ‘democratic new era’ by the government for Kurdish minorities.
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Some

legislative changes have been introduced allowing for radio and TV broadcasting as well and the
Turkish Public Television (TRT) started broadcasting in Kurdish although some restrictions on the
types of programs such as political ones were still kept. 388
Accordingly, the restriction of Kurdish language has been a problem for the political
participation of Kurds in Turkey as well. Kurdish politicians have been facing court cases because
of giving speech in their own language, based on the Article 8 of the Constitution, the Anti-Terror
Law, which prohibited the dissemination of separatist propaganda. 389 As discussed before, the
Constitutional Court caused many Kurdish politicians, mayors and non-governmental
representatives being tried in courts and convicted. 390 Thus, in the case of Turkey, the ‘significant
institutions’ and the ‘mobilization of minorities’ have been two conflicting domestic factor
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affecting Europeanization process. However, with the Kurdish Opening Initiative led by the Justice
and Development Party (AKP) government, pro-Kurdish politicians and political parties used
Kurdish in the most recent local elections in 2009 and no legal action was launched. 391
On the other hand, for political participation, the electoral system is also a problem that
prevents minorities to be represented in the Parliament, which makes the mobilization for Kurds
harder, and thus ‘mobilization’ as a variable to be less affective. In Turkey, 10 percent electoral
threshold for political parties entering parliament is a level that Kurds cannot reach nationally. As
this has made it difficult for Kurdish politicians to enter politics, they have been mobilizing as
‘independent’ candidates for the Parliament, who join the pro-Kurdish party after being elected.
Thus, the rise of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which has managed to gain
35 seats in the 550-member Parliament in 2011, has been one of the positive changes in recent
years that provided ground for mobilization of Kurds. 392
In sum, the analysis of the process of Europeanization in Turkey in the field of minority
protection policies during the time frame between 1999 and 2012 indicate that the process has
been under the impact of domestic factors despite the strong pressure from the European
Commission for the application of the ‘conditionality’ for the EU membership. As discussed, the
significant changes in the state policies towards the Kurdish minorities after 2002 shows that, the
variable of the ‘position of the governments’ have strong influence on the process, which is
outlined by the comparison of the governments before and after 2002 here. Thus, the analysis of
‘significant institutions’ is consistent with my hypothesis, claiming that both the President and the
Constitutional Courts have been affective in the process. The two different Presidents, who served
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in this time frame, followed two different attitudes towards protection of Kurds. While the
Constitutional Court have been blocking the process with its decisions at some points, the Justice
and Development Party (AKP) government with the support of the President Gul have been
significant actors for positive changes in the process. On the other hand, Turkey still employs
restrictive measures on minority rights due to the reasons discussed about the Constitution,
providing the Constitutional Court as a significant institution to be the major restrictor of
Europeanization process in minority protection issues. In such a political settlement, the
mobilization of the Kurds occurred in both political and insurgent way, which can be considered
as a success, since in the most recent general elections in 2011, the Kurdish representatives took
35 seats in the Parliament and gained several cultural rights as discussed before.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: UNDER WHICH DOMESTIC CONDITIONS EUROPEANIZATION OCCURS IN
MINORITY PROTECTION?
6.1. Introduction
‘Europeanization’ has been referring to top-down democratization process of the states in
the enlargement track of the European Union, thus becoming one of the most widely used
theoretical approaches for studying the EU and its influence on the current and future EU member
states.393 While there is considerable debate about how to define the concept of
‘Europeanization’ (Börzel 2002; Börzel and Risse 2003, 2007; Cowles et al. 2001; Featherstone and
Radaelli 2003; Ladrech 2010; Mair 2000; Radaelli 2003), the term is generally used as ‘the
domestic impact of the EU’ through the diffusion of its ideas rules, values and norms (Börzel and
Risse, 2008).
‘Conditionality’ is a concept placed at the center of the concept of ‘Europeanization’,
which is based on reinforcement of the EU rules by the reward, EU membership. Thus, the analysis
of the effectiveness of reinforcement by reward strategy under the ‘conditionality’ requires
analyzing the reality of the impact of domestic factors during the Europeanization process. Thus,
this research seeks to answer a highly related question that, whether the domestic variables have
influence on the Europeanization of minority protection policies in the EU candidate states and to
what extent it matters for three countries, Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey.
The first part of this question addresses the impact of external incentives, namely the EU
membership, on compliance patterns of the candidate states with the EU requirements to
demonstrate the specific demands from the EU on minority protection policies. The second part
of the question is related to impact of domestic characteristic, that carry different dynamics to
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Europeanization process. In this sense it is argued that the transformative power of the EU is
filtered by the domestic factors, which in turn either supports or blocks the process of
Europeanization in that state.
6.2. Theoretical and Methodological Framework
This dissertation tested hypotheses derived from the external incentives model to examine
the conditions under which governments, significant institutions and ethnic minorities in Latvia,
Bulgaria and Turkey have complied, or partially complied or rejected to comply with the political
demands of the EU, which outlined different Europeanization patterns of these countries from the
year of their candidacy to the year of accession to the European Union. The case study of Latvia is
conducted for the time frame between 1997 and 2004, and Bulgaria’s case study is framed
between 1997 and 2007. The case study of Turkey is an exemption as that country is still a
candidate for the European Union membership. Thus, the time frame of the analysis of Turkey is
between 1999 and 2012.
For each case study, a similar basic template is used, which begins with initial conflict and
different issues of violation in the field of human rights and minority protection in the target
country, and continues with demands and conditions from the European Union under
‘conditionality’ requirements for the EU membership. The analysis finalizes with the outcome of
the process of Europeanization where the compliance patterns of the states are analyzed from the
year of their candidacy to the year of accession to the European Union. Furthermore, postaccession patterns in each country is analyzed to see the most recent developments in the field of
minority protection, and to understand whether Europeanization is an ongoing process. The
empirical analysis of the cases revealed that the reward offered as the ultimate goal, which is the
European Union membership status, does not lead to complete compliance with the EU rules and
norms or a long lasting reform process in that target country unless the domestic features provide
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a fertile ground. Thus, the ‘governments’, ‘significant institutions’, and ‘mobilization’ appeared as
domestic variables, which significantly affect the process of Europeanization in the field of
minority protection in Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey.
The case selection for these analyses is consistent with the goal of generalizability of the
findings, which followed two criteria. The first one is significant ‘conflict’ between the EU rules
and the initial situation in the candidate state in the field of minority protection. Thus, I selected
‘hard cases’ for the methodological reason that the EU conditionality and its effects are more
easily observable than in ‘easy cases’, which acceded to the European Union with their already
established legal provisions on the human rights issue. Nevertheless, by choosing ‘hard cases’, I
was able to learn more about the domestic conditions and their effectiveness, since their
challenge to conditionality would be higher in cases of significant conflict. 394 The second criterion
of case selection is the ‘size of minorities’. For a better analysis, I selected cases with at least 15
percent ethnic minorities within whole population. This criterion was crucial for the case studies,
because countries with small number of ethnic population would be an ‘easy case’, which would
not be fruitful for an analysis. As discussed in each chapters, only the largest ethnic minorities are
taken into consideration for the analysis.
6.3. Europeanization of Minority Protection Policies Across Three Cases
The position of the governments
In the field of minority protection, ‘governments’ are one of the inevitable domestic
factors. The likelihood of adoption may decrease with net political or power costs of governments
from fulfilling the EU requirements. Thus, the governments in the candidate states are likely to
calculate whether the rewards offered by the EU are worth the costs of adaptation. The size of
domestic adoption costs, therefore, determines whether they will accept or reject the conditions
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(Schimmelfennig 2008). When the political costs of Europeanization are high for the target
government, that is, when fulfilling EU conditions threatens the government’s domestic power
base, and its core political practices for power preservation, even credible membership incentives
may turn out to be ineffective.395
From this perspective, in terms of Europeanization of minority policies, policy preferences
of a government can be either in favor of adopting EU standards for minority protection if the
government has a pro-minority orientation and/or includes representatives from minorities within
the government. As the adoption of rules does not bring high adoption cost at the domestic level
for the government, the adoption of the EU rules are likely (Schimmelfennig 2008). On the other
hand, in case of a government with nationalist oriented parties, who are generally based on
single-ethnic platform that constitute the majority of the population in a state, take part in the
coalitions are likely to postpone the adoption of minority protection due to the fear of political
failure in elections.

According to Kelley (2004a, 2004b), the inclusion of minority parties

representing an ethnic group on the one hand and right-wing pro-nation parties on the other in
government is an important factor in determining the state policy towards minorities and the
reaction to external demands to protect minorities. Thus, the coalition governments with prominority parties are likely to be willing to implement minority rights, unlike governments with a
strong nationalist influence are likely to resist this.
The hypotheses tested about the position of the governments brought the similar findings
across cases of Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey in the field of minority protection. The nationalist
standing of the unstable governments in Latvia is one of the strong conclusions of the hypotheses.
The unstable political environment in Latvia in the pre-accession period supported short-term
coalition, mostly lead by center-right political parties that either ignore or oppose the
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Europeanization of minority protection policies. The post-accession analysis of the ‘governments’
is consistent with the pre-accession period. Although 2011 elections brought success for the proRussian Harmony Center, it was excluded from the coalition led by right-wing parties, which in
turn brought Language Law referendum in 2012, that failed.
Bulgaria appeared as a case with similar facts and conclusions with Latvia. The analysis of
the domestic factors show that the governments served during the time frame of analysis have not
been interested in minority protection policies although the EU membership has been on the
agenda of all of them. Despite several provisions and projects such as Commission for Protection
against Discrimination, Framework Program for Equal Integration of Roma in Bulgarian Society or
the independent Commission for Protection against Discrimination, amendments to the National
Education Law, and the National Roma Integration Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria, the
analysis of both pre-accession and post-accession periods of Bulgaria reveals that lack of
enforcement for the provisions related to minority protection issues mostly have been affecting
Roma population in Bulgaria due to ignorant position of the governments served between 19972007 and 2007-2012.
Unlike the governments served for Latvia and Bulgaria, during the frame of my analysis,
the governments of Turkey appeared as supportive of Europeanization process. Especially, in
terms of cultural rights, the developments have been promising after the declaration of Turkey’s
EU candidacy due to the ‘position of the governments’, such as amendment of the Constitution to
lift the ban on the use of languages other than Turkish, and the celebration of Newroz, the
‘Kurdish New Year’,

allowing private schools to teach Kurdish language with permission,

broadcasting in the ethnic languages by removing the bans on newspapers, journals, TV, and
radios and launching the first 24-hour Kurdish-language TV station and most significantly the
Kurdish Opening Initiative that suggested bringing a wide range of rights for the Kurds. For the
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political structure of Turkey, these developments are significant enough to support my hypotheses
about the impact of governments on Europeanization.
Significant Institutions
There are various institutions that contribute to the process of Europeanization in the field
of minority protection either positively or negatively at the domestic level (Tsebelis 2002). These
institutions may include political, judicial, or even military institutions, depending on the state
analyzed. In terms of the analysis of the minority protection policies, to be able to compare the
three cases, and test the hypotheses equally, instead of focusing on the number of veto players
affective in the process, as required by the veto players theory, I focus on two significant
institutions that exist in all three cases. I consider Presidents and Constitutional Courts to be two
significant institutions to be analyzed as domestic factors to have impact on the process of
Europeanization. Depending on their policy preferences, these institutions might either block
positive proposals or attempt to revoke existing rules or support the required change.
Across all three cases, the two significant institutions analyzed, the Presidents and the
Constitutional Courts appeared to have different positions towards the process of
Europeanization. In the case of Latvia, the analysis of the ‘significant institutions’ brought two
diverse attitudes, in which the Presidents appeared as more positive towards Europeanization
process, while the Constitutional Courts further supported the legal provisions blocking the
process.
Similarly, rights for the ethnic groups, which are banned by the Constitution, have been a
continuing problem in Bulgaria. Ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities signed by the Bulgarian President in 1997 and ratified by the Parliament in
1999, caused a major controversy in Bulgarian politics due to the use of the word ‘minorities’. The
former authoritarian Soviet background of Bulgaria and accordingly the lack of civil society did
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not allow the ‘minorities’ to define themselves in Bulgaria and get the required respect and
recognition especially in the Constitution. Thus, positive attitudes of the President’s, could not
succeed in drawing the lines for the term ‘minority’ due to lack of support with the legal
framework, which is related to the ambiguity in the legal framework in the human rights and
minority protection issues in Bulgaria. Although, the President signed the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities and the Parliament ratified in 1999, the Constitutional
restrictions on the rights of minorities contradicted with these new provisions.
Furthermore, the decision of the Constitutional Court, such as banning the pro-ethnic
political parties on the grounds that it promotes separatism and the rejection of the claim by the
pro-Turkish Party MRF concerning the 1996 Law on Radio and Television, which banned
broadcasting in minority languages, slowed down the Europeanization of minority protection
policies in Bulgaria. On the whole, the analysis on Europeanization of minority protection policies
in Bulgaria during the time frame between 1997 and 2007 pointed out that inability of the Roma
community to mobilize was the major factor that explain different outcome of Europeanization
process for Turks and Roma.
The findings about the significant institutions in Turkey are consistent with those in Latvia
and Bulgaria, which in turn supports my hypotheses on the significant institutions’ impact on the
process of Europeanization. Similar to other two cases, the analysis of Europeanization of minority
protection policies in Turkey during the time frame between 1999 and 2012 revealed that the
legal framework of the minority protection policies is the major problem that blocks the process
of Europeanization. As a significant institution, the President served after 2007 further supported
these initiatives from the government, while the previous President Sezer strongly opposed on the
basis of the Kemalist ideology of a ‘single ethnic’ state. The support from the President Gul, who
served after 2007, is directly related to his ideological link with the government as he used to be
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the Prime Minister and leaded the Justice and Development Party government before. However,
despite the President’s support, the legal framework of the Turkey blocked the process of
Europeanization through the Constitutional Court, specifically for the cultural rights and political
representation. Many Kurdish politicians faced court cases because of giving speech in their own
language, based on the Article 8 of the Constitution, the Anti-Terror Law and convicted.396
The mobilization of minorities
In case of reluctant governments and unsupportive institutions, we can expect a bottomup mobilization to be a central factor for Europeanization in the field of human rights (Keck and
Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999). However, in literature it has been argued that the lack of civil
society and relatedly the ability to mobilize in favor of societal demands is generally low in
former-authoritarian Central and Eastern European countries, thus rule adoption is mainly
government-driven (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006). On the other hand, a large and
well organized minority group can be expected to be much more able to put pressure on
unsupportive bodies than small and poorly organized ones. To be able to measure the concept of
‘minority mobilization’, I considered two indicators: (1) the size of the ethnic minority group,
which is the percentage of the overall population and (2) the number of organizations founded on
the grounds of protection of ethnic minorities and lobbying for their cultural and political rights
and recognition.
The analysis of the findings across three cases revealed the significance of the
‘mobilization of minorities’ as a variable, thus supporting my hypotheses. In the case of Latvia,
despite large number of Russians, the level of mobilization was low and not significantly effective
either through social or political mobilization in Latvia because of the lack of participation from
the ethnic Russian community. On the other hand, in the post-accession period a top-down
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mobilization launched by the Russian leaders on the minority protection, such as the success of
the pro-Russian Harmony Center in the 2011 elections and the 2012 referendum, both of failed in
the end. 397
Similarly, although Bulgaria acceded to the European Union in 2007, it is not possible to
talk about a perfect compliance for the human rights and minority protection acquis of the
European Union. These findings are also consistent with the developments during post-accession
period of Bulgaria. As discussed before in Chapter 4, the Turkish population continued gaining
more seats in the Parliament, as well as recognition and rights due to successful mobilization,
while the Roma continued being in a disadvantaged situation. Consequently, showing two
different paths followed by two equally disadvantaged ethnic group, the analysis of Bulgaria also
supports my theory of the impact of ‘mobilization’ as a domestic factor on Europeanization
process.
Turkey is another case under significant ‘mobilization’ impact among Kurds against the
status quo. The findings of the analysis about Turkey revealed that the positive attitudes from the
governments and the successful mobilization among Kurds supported the process of
Europeanization in minority protection policies in Turkey, despite the Constitutional blocks
through the Constitutional Court. Thus, the analysis showed that in the case of Turkey, the
‘significant institutions’’ and the ‘mobilization of minorities’ have been two conflicting domestic
factor affecting Europeanization process. However, despite the Constitutional restrictions and the
electoral system with 10 percent threshold for political parties entering parliament, which is a
level that Kurds cannot reach, Kurds succeeded in mobilizing as ‘independent’ candidates for the
Parliament, who join the pro-Kurdish party after being elected. Thus, pro-Kurdish Peace and
Democracy Party (BDP) managed to gain 35 seats in the 550-member Parliament in 2011 that
397
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provided ground for political mobilization of Kurds, while the insurgent group Kurdistan Worker’s
Party (PKK) is still present. In sum, the analysis of the process of Europeanization in Turkey in the
field of minority protection policies during the time frame between 1999 and 2012 indicate that
the process has been under the impact of domestic factors despite the strong pressure from the
European Commission for the application of the ‘conditionality’ for the EU membership.
6.4. Limitations of the Analysis
The comparative analysis of three cases in this dissertation has not been free of limitations.
First of all, Europeanization, which is the major concept of the research, occurred differently for
each case at different time frames. Thus, while both Latvia and Bulgaria acceded to the European
Union, Turkey is still a candidate. Secondly, all three cases have different historical backgrounds in
terms of length of democracy, and the politics of human rights and minority protection, which
makes a comparison between Latvia, Bulgaria and Turkey somewhat problematic. While both
Latvia and Bulgaria have Communist backgrounds, and are relatively young states, Turkey does
not have this experience, and is an older state, founded in 1923. Another limitation is the
significant difference in the population in each case. Whereas Turkey has a population of 79
million, Latvia has 2.3 million, Bulgaria has 7.6 million. Although, in this study I take percentage of
ethnic minorities into consideration, this large difference among three cases in terms of
population is a limitation of the study.
Despite all these limitations, the variations in the features of these three cases can be
perceived as advantageous for an enriched, in-depth comparative analysis, since it is relevant to
compare Turkey, Bulgaria and Latvia that have significant problems with the ethnic minority
population, which is crucial for answering the main question of this dissertation about the impact
of the domestic factors on Europeanization of minority policies.
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6.5. Conclusion and Agenda for Future Research
The findings across three case studies supported my hypotheses about the impact of
‘position of the governments’, ‘significant institutions’ and ‘mobilization of minorities’ on the
process of Europeanization in the field of minority protection. The unstable governments and
coalitions of mostly center-right parties, unsupportive institutions, especially the decisions of the
Constitutional Courts and lack of mobilization among Russians are three important domestic
factors that leaded to unsuccessful Europeanization in the field of minority protection in Latvia.
Although the governments and the significant institutions have been in a similar attitude in
Bulgaria as in the case of Latvia, the ‘mobilization of minorities’ brought two different outcomes of
Europeanization for Turks and Roma population. The findings of the analysis revealed that
although the candidacy process of Bulgaria supported Turks to become integrated in the society
and politically salient, due to lack of mobilization Roma community ended up with unsuccessful
Europeanization process. Similar to successful mobilization of Turks in Bulgaria, the situation of
Kurds in Turkey can be considered as improved in several occasions due to successful mobilization
among Kurds. The positive attitudes of the governments served after 2002 and the President
served after 2007 are two domestic facts that cannot be ignored; however, the strict legal
framework and accordingly, the unsupportive decisions by the Constitutional Court have blocked
Europeanization process in the field of minority protection. Thus, taking the present situation of
Russians in Latvia, Turks and Roma in Bulgaria and Kurds in Turkey into consideration,
‘mobilization’ is the most significant domestic variable that brings either adoption of the acquis

communitaire on human rights and respect for minorities in these case studies.
It is also important that future researchers investigate whether the findings in this study
can be replicated in other European Union member or candidate states, in particular, recently
acceded ones in Central and Eastern Europe. Romania, Lithuania, Hungary, and Estonia will be
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ideal case studies since these countries share similar cultural and political attitudes, especially
with Latvia and Bulgaria, and have significant numbers of ethnic minorities although not as large
as the three cases analyzed here.
Future researchers can also find comparable data from the old member states with
significant number of ethnic minorities and problems at the domestic level. However, the
framework for these researches would not be on the basis of ‘membership conditionality’ of the
Copenhagen Criteria, as this has been approved after 1993 and does not apply to the older
members of the European Union. The most relevant case studies from the old members of the
European Union could be Spain and U.K., in where there is significant conflict between the state
and ethnic minorities. The comparison of the cases from old members, along with new members,
would help scholars draw conclusions about the factors determining different attitudes on human
rights and minority protection in these states. Furthermore, the different attitudes on policy
transfer on human rights issues both at domestic and European level could be analyzed. For the
cases that have violent conflict between the state and ethnic minorities, ‘mobilization’ of ethnic
minorities would be a fruitful variable the future researchers to investigate the patterns of
contentious politics in European states. Nevertheless, for future research, adding other domestic
variables would be useful, such as the economic, social and cultural variables, to be able to look
from a different perspective to the process of Europeanization in the field of human rights and
minority protection in candidate/member states of the European Union, specifically in the most
recent members acceded after 2004.
Based on the analysis of Europeanization strategy in all three cases during their candidacy,
it is revealed that the conditionality strategy has been ineffective to achieve compliance under
the constraints of the domestic factors. This does not only show the problems of Europeanization
that the European actors must take into account of, but also reveals the importance of the
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domestic variables as an influence mechanism in order to assure compliance and to promote
Europeanization. Moreover, the role of the Presidents and the Constitutional Courts as a
significant institutions resisting against the power of EU conditionality should also be taken into
account since they apparently block the governments’ attitudes towards a reformist trajectory.
The active participation of the ethnic minorities in the minority related issues as the domestic
actors is important as it helps strategizing the process of mobilization for Europeanization. Thus,
the collaboration between governments, significant institutions and the mobilized ethnic
minorities at domestic level is the key for the success of eventual Europeanization in a
candidate/member state.
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Appendix A: Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993398
7. Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe
A. The Associated Countries
i) The European Council held a thorough discussion on the relations between the
Community and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with which the Community has
concluded or plans to conclude Europe agreements ("associated countries"), on the basis of the
Commission's communication prepared at the invitation of the Edinburgh European Council.
ii) The European Council welcomed the courageous efforts undertaken by the associated
countries to modernize their economies, which have been weakened by 40 years of central
planning, and to ensure a rapid transition to a market economy. The Community and its Member
States pledge their support to this reform process. Peace and security in Europe depend on the
success of those efforts.
iii) The European Council today agreed that the associated countries in Central and
Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union. Accession will take
place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by
satisfying the economic and political conditions required.
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the
candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of
political, economic and monetary union. The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while
maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the
general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries. The European Council will
continue to follow closely progress in each associated country towards fulfilling the conditions of
accession to the Union and draw the appropriate conclusions.
17. Racism and Xenophobia
The European Council strongly condemned the recent attacks on immigrants and refugees
in its Member States and expressed its deep sympathy with the innocent victims of such
aggressions. The European Council reiterated its strong resolve to fight by all available means
intolerance and racism in all its forms. It stressed that such intolerance and racism is unacceptable
in our present day societies.
The European Council confirmed the commitment to protect everybody, including
immigrants and refugees, against violations of fundamental rights and freedoms as embodied in
constitutions and laws of Member States, the European Convention on Human Rights and other
international conventions, including the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all
forms of Racial Discrimination.
The European Council recalled its previous declarations on racism and xenophobia and
decided to intensify the efforts to identify and to root out the causes. It pledged that Member
States will do their utmost to protect immigrants, refugees and others against expressions and
manifestations of racism and intolerance.
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Full text available at “Conclusions of the Presidency”, Copenhagen June 21-22 1993, accessed
January 20, 2012, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/copenhagen/co_en.pdf
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Appendix B: The European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,
Council of Europe, 1998399
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Convention) was
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1994 and entered Pamphlet
No. 8 of the UN Guide for Minorities into force in 1998. It is the first legally binding multilateral
instrument devoted to the protection of minorities and is regarded as the most comprehensive
international standard in the field of minority rights so far. To a large extent, it transforms the
political commitments of the 1990 Copenhagen Document of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) into legal obligations.
The Framework Convention may be ratified by member States of the Council of Europe,
and non-member States may join at the invitation of the Committee of Ministers. Accession to the
Convention is obligatory, at least politically, for States that apply for membership in the Council of
Europe. As of May 2001, the Convention had been ratified by 33 countries: Albania, Armenia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (non-member State), Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
The Substantive Provisions of the Convention
Article 4.1 of the Convention proclaims the fundamental principles of nondiscrimination
and equality. Article 4.2 makes it clear that a State’s obligations may also require affirmative
action on the part of the government and not merely abstention from discrimination. States are to
adopt, “where necessary”, measures to promote “full and effective equality between persons
belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the majority” taking “due account of the
specific conditions” of national minorities. Article 4.2 is a key provision, since it provides the basis
for the succeeding provisions that spell out in greater detail the measures that States should take
in specific areas. Article 4.3 clarifies that any measures taken to promote effective equality are not
to be considered as discrimination themselves.
The remaining substantive provisions of the Convention cover a wide range of issues, many
of which may require that States adopt special measures. Ratifying States agree to:
· promote the conditions necessary for minorities to maintain and develop their culture
and identity (Article 5)
· encourage tolerance, mutual respect, and understanding among all persons living on
their territory (Article 6)
· protect the rights to freedom of assembly, association, expression, thought, conscience,
and religion (Articles 7, 8, and 9)
· facilitate access to mainstream media and promote the creation and use of minority
media (Article 9)
· recognize the right to use a minority language in private and in public and display
information in the minority language (Articles 10 and 11)
· recognize officially surnames and first names in the minority language (Article 11)
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Full text available at “European Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities”, Council of Europe 1998, accessed January 20, 2012,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/1_AtGlance/PDF_H(95)10_FCNM_ExplanRepor
t_en.pdf
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∙ “endeavour to ensure” the right to use the minority language before administrative
authorities and to display bilingual topographical indications in the minority language in areas
inhabited by national minorities “traditionally” or “in substantial numbers” (Articles 10 and 11)
· foster knowledge of the culture, history, language, and religion of both majority and
minorities (Article 12)
· recognize the rights of minorities to set up and manage their own educational
establishments and learn their own language (Articles 13 and 14)
∙ “endeavour to ensure” that there are adequate opportunities to be taught in the minority
language, in areas traditionally inhabited by national minorities or where they live in “substantial
numbers” (Article 14)
∙ “create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to
national minorities in cultural, social and economic life, and in public affairs, in particular those
affecting them” (Article 15)
· refrain from measures that alter the proportions of the population in areas inhabited by
minorities (Article 16)
· not interfere with the rights to maintain contacts across frontiers and participate in the
activities of national and international NGOs (Article 17)
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